Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Beddoes v. Giffin : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William P. Morrison; Grant W.P. Morrison; Morrison & Morrison, LC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Sean A. Monson; Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deere; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Beddoes v. Giffin, No. 20060389 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6466

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

William G. Beddoes,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

Supreme Court No. 20060389

Gary Giffin,

Court of Appeals No. 20051154-CA

Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

William P. Morrison (7587)
Grant W. P. Morrison (3666)
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
Attorneys at Law
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant

Sean A. Monson
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Tel: (801) 438-2000
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP " 8 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page:
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

in

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

1

A.
B.
C.
D.

Date of Entry of Decision to Be Reviewed
Date of Entry of Orders on Rehearing and Extending Time
Reliance upon Rule 47(c) Where Cross Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is Filed
Statute Conferring Jurisdiction on Utah Supreme Court

1
1
1
2

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.
B.
C.
D.

Nature of the Case
Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition
Court of Appeals' Proceedings & Disposition
Statement of Facts

2
3
4
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

I.

II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS NOT INVOKED UNTIL
ALL CONTESTED ISSUES ARE RESOLVED AT THE TRIAL
COURT LEVEL
BEDDOES' APPEAL WAS DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF
INAPPOSITE CASE LAW AND DICTUM

6
12

A.

Nielson Is Inapposite

13

B.

ProMax Was Misapplied

14

I

III.

THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES IN
CONSTRUING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

17

CONCLUSION

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

23

APPENDIX

24

A.

Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 2006

B.

Appellate Orders:
- Order of December 29, 2005 of Utah Supreme Court
- Order of July 17, 2006 of Utah Supreme Court

C.

Trial Court's Relevant Orders
- Order of September 22, 2005
- Order of November 29, 2005

D.

Other Relevant Judicial Opinions
- Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115
(Utah 1998)
- Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994)
- ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4
- Loffredo v. Holt. 37 P.3d 1070 (Utah 2001)
- Fielden v. Hansen. 2005 UT App 426 (per curiam)
- Norman I. Kmg Real Estate Investments. Inc.. v. Praszker.
269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990)

E.

Trial Court Docket & Appellate Docket

F.

Utah R. App. P. 51(b)
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page:
Cases:
Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947)

17

Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999)

1

Beddoes v. Giffin. 2006 UT App 130

4

Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.. 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (1988)

8

California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d 556
(9th Cir. 1991)

12 n.2

Loffredo v. Holt. 37 P.3d 1070 (Utah 2001)

6, 9, 10, 19, 19 n.3

Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115
(Utah 1998)

7,8,9,11,12n.2,14,15,17,18,19,22

Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994^

11 n.1,12,13,14,15,16

Norman I. King Real Estate Investments. Inc.. v. Praszker. 269 Cal. Rptr.
228, 233 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990)
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 998 P.2d 254,
2000 UT 4

12 n.2

8,11 n.1,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 n.3

Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75

1

Sittner v. Schriever. 2 P.3d 442. 2000 UT 45

9

State v. Harmon. 910P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)

1

Taylor v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
Statutes:
Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a)

6,7,8,9,11
2

iii

Rules:
Utah R. App. P. 3

6,18

Utah R. App. P. 51(b)

5

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)

2, 20 n.4

iv

ISSUED PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:
Pursuant to this Court's Order of July 17, 2006, which granted William Beddoes'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the sole issue presented for review is:
"Whether a motion for an award of costs, filed after the entry of judgment, delays
the entry of judgment for puiposes of appeal until the motion is resolved."

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 978 P.2d
460 (Utah 1999); State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The court of
appeals' legal conclusions are reviewed for coiTectness and are accorded no deference by
this Court. Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75, 10.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT:
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter as follows:
A.

Date of Entry of Decision to Be Reviewed: The Utah Court of Appeals'

Memorandum Decision was entered on March 30, 2006. (Appendix A.)
B.

Petitioner/Appellant William Beddoes (hereinafter "'Beddoes") filed a

Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 28, 2006.
C.

The Utah Supreme Court granted Beddoes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari

on July 17, 2006, as to the issue for review presented above. (Appendix B.)
1

D.

Statute Conferring Jurisdiction on Supreme Court: Appellate jurisdiction to

review a judgment of the court of appeals is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(a).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS:
Rule 51(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs disposition of
petitions for writ of certiorari, where an order granting a petition has been entered. A
copy of Rule 51(b) is attached at Appendix F.
Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs disposition of a request
for court costs. A copy is attached at Appendix Ff

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
A.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from the summary judgment dismissal of Beddoes' complaint for

malicious prosecution. [R. at 196-197 (summary judgment order).] Beddoes filed the
complaint seeking redress for the damages he incurred in defending himself against
certain ciiminal accusations made by the respondent/appellee, Gaiy Giffm (hereinafter
"GiffirT). [R. at 1-9.] Beddoes alleged that Giffin's accusations were entirely false.
[Id.] The accusations resulted in Beddoes being prosecuted for aggravated assault, a third
degree felony. [Id.] Beddoes fought this charge in court. [Id.] The charge was
ultimately reduced to a misdemeanor count of reckless endangerment. [Id.] Beddoes
obtained an acquittal at trial. [Id.] He then initiated this case against Giffm. [Id.] The
2

matter is now before this Court on appeal.

R

Trial Court Proceedings & Disposition:
At the trial court level, Giffin filed a motion for summary judgment on June 13,

2005. [R. at 43-45.] After Beddoes submitted a memorandum in opposition to the
motion [R. at 123-146], the matter was set down for oral argument on September 2, 2005.
[R. at 195.] Following argument, the trial court determined that Giffin did not actively
initiate criminal proceedings against Beddoes, thus negating one of the essential elements
of a prima facie claim of malicious prosecution. [R. at 244.] Consequently, the trial
court entered summary judgment in Giffin's favor, thereby dismissing Beddoes'
complaint. [R. at 244, 196-197.] The trial court's ruling was subsequently reduced to
judgment on September 22, 2005. [R. at 196-197.]
Shortly thereafter, on September 29, 2005, Giffin filed a timely request for an
award of court costs. [R. at 198-210.] Beddoes opposed this request, deeming it
improper and unsupported. [R. at 211-213.] On November 2, 2005, the trial court
entered a Minute Entry agreeing with Beddoes' position and denying Giffin's cost
request. [R. at 220-221.] That Minute Entry was subsequently reduced to an Order on
November 28, 2005. [R. at 227-228.] Beddoes then initiated the instant appeal by filing
a notice of appeal on December 22, 2005. [R. at 229-230.]

C

Court of Appeals Proceedings & the Disposition Below:
Jurisdiction over this appeal was originally with the Utah Supreme Court. [A copy

of the appellate docket in this case is attached at Appendix E.] On December 29, 2005,
this Court entered an Order transferring the case to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition. [Appendix B.] Thereafter, on January 17, 2006, Giffin filed a motion for
summaiy disposition, asserting that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the
appeal. [Appendix E.] Giffm claimed that the final judgment in this case was entered
below on September 22, 2005 (the summaiy judgment order), not on November 28, 2005
(the cost denial order). Beddoes filed a memorandum in opposition to Giffin's motion for
summaiy disposition, asserting that the order of November 28, 2005, was the final
judgment. [Id.]
The court of appeals took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a
Memorandum Decision on March 30, 2006. [Beddoes v. Giffin, 2006 UT App 130;
Appendix A.] The court of appeals agreed with Giffin's position, concluding that the
summaiy judgment order of September 22, 2005, was the final judgment in this case, not
the order of November 28, 2005, even though the September order left in controversy a
dispute as to the recoverability of court costs. [Id.] The court of appeals therefore
dismissed Beddoes' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. [Id.]
Beddoes subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on April
28, 2006. Said petition was granted on July 17, 2006. [Appendix B.]

4

D.

Statement of Facts;
Because the Utah Court of Appeals granted summary disposition and did not reach

the merits of this case, the only facts relevant to the questions presented for review herein
are the procedural facts set forth above.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To conserve judicial resources, and to provide a clear, consistent, and uniform
approach to thefinaljudgment mle, this Court should conclude that a timely filed request
for court costs delays entry of judgment for purposes of appeal, until the cost request
matter is resolved. Adopting this approach conserves judicial resources by allowing all
appealable issues in a case to be handled in a single notice of appeal, rather than by
requiring a second, separate notice of appeal to address the cost request determination.
Further, this approach fosters clarity and consistency in the appellate process by affording
equal treatment to collateral matters of attorney fees and court costs, arising at or near the
entry of judgment.
Utah law already delays entiy of afinaljudgment to allow collateral attorney fee
issues to be resolved at the trial court level, prior to permitting an appeal. This Court
should apply the same mle to collateral court cost matters. There is no good, compelling
reason for the Court to draw a distinction between these two collateral issues.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS NOT INVOKED UNTIL
ALL CONTESTED ISSUES ARE RESOLVED AT THE TRIAL
COURT LEVEL

It is axiomatic that an appeal may only be taken after entry of a final judgment.
See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 3. A judgment is not final until it ends the controversy
between the parties. Loffredo v. Holt 37 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Utah 2001). To qualify as
a final judgment, it is not enough for a judgment to dispose of most of the claims in
dispute in a case; instead, it must dispose of all of the claims of all of the parties. Id.
In this jurisdiction, the notion of what constitutes a final judgment has recently
undergone a fundamental change. A shift in emphasis has occurred, whereby the
principle of judicial economy in the appeals process has been elevated to the forefront.
The overriding concern of this shift in emphasis has been an effort to conserve scarce
judicial resources by requiring all appealable issues in a case to be presented and resolved
in a single notice of appeal. This is in sharp contrast to the old approach of requiring
litigants to separately appeal collateral matters that are adjudicated following entry of a
judgment on the merits.
The old approach to the final judgment rule is expressed in Taylor v. Hansen, 958
P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). At issue in Taylor was the timeliness of an appeal that
had been brought following entry of a judgment on the merits, leaving a dispute at the
trial court level as to how much should be awarded in attorney fees to the prevailing
party. In resolving this issue, the court of appeals looked to federal law for guidance. It
6

noted that in the federal system, a judgment is deemed final for puiposes of invoking
appellate jurisdiction when it resolves the underlying merits of the case, regardless of
whether there remains in controversy any dispute over collateral issues such as court
costs and attorney fees. Id. at 926-27. The court of appeals elected to adopt this
approach. It stated: "Our adoption of this rule will eliminate uncertainty about the
propriety of filing a notice of appeal when attorney fee issues are unresolved and avoid
problematic situations when a party may delay or never apply for a quantification of
fees." Id. at 927-928.
Arguably, the Taylor approach to the final judgment rule remained good law in
Utah for only 12 days. Almost immediately after its release, Taylor was supplanted by
this Court's contrary holding in Meadowbrook v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).
While not explicitly overruling Taylor, the Meadowbrook court clearly undertook a
different approach to interpreting and applying the final judgment rule.
In Meadowbrook. this Court tackled the issue of whether a prevailing party at trial
had waived its right to request attorney fees, where such fees were first requested in a
post-trial motion filed before entry of judgment. Rejecting the federal approach that had
been adopted in Taylor, this Court concluded that judicial economy in the appeals process
would not be served by construing the final judgment rule narrowly to exclude
disposition of collateral matters such as the recoverability of attorney fees. The Court
stated that separating such collateral matters from the underlying merits of a case would
waste judicial resources by requiring multiple, piecemeal appeals. The Court reasoned as
7

follows:
[A] party who appeals the judgment on the underlying merits may also
wish to appeal the attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a
motion for such fees to be brought after the time for filing an appeal
on the original judgment has expired, the appellant would have to file
a second appeal based upon the attorney fee award. Judicial
economy during the appeals process would not be furthered in any
way by requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a party's
decision to appeal on the underlying merits may largely depend upon
the size of the attorney fee award. ... Absent a rule or statutory
provision to the contrary, the rule we adopt today prevents a party
from bringing a post-judgment motion for attorney fees and will
generally enable an appellant to appeal all issues, including an award
of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal.
Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
It did not take long for the issues involved in Taylor and Meadowbrook to
resurface. In ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 2000 UT 4, this Court had
occasion to revisit Meadowbrook, and to compare its approach with the competing
approach established in Taylor. The Court ultimately concluded that the Meadowbrook
approach was the better reasoned approach. It stated:
We are aware that in Taylor v. Hanson, 958 P.2d 923, 927 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), the court of appeals adopted the rule enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
486 U.S. 196, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1998). ... We
decline to follow that rule. Instead, we follow the principle set out in
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1998). ...
It will save the resources of the parties and this court if the issue of
attorney fees can be determined in the same appeal in which the
merits of the underlying judgment are examined. Otherwise, a
second appeal must be taken to challenge the amount of attorney
fees awarded subsequent to the judgment on the merits and then
8

examined in the light of the judgment on the merits. This would be
wasteful. We therefore hold that, in the interest of judicial economy,
a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to
a party before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an
appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will
serve both litigants and this court well, by "enabling] an appellant to
appeal all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single
notice of appeal." Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119.
2000 UT 4,ffif13-14 (emphasis added).
To remove any lingering doubt about the continued vitality of Taylor, this Court
expressly overruled Taylor in Sittner v. Schrieven 2 P.3d 923, 2000 UT 45. In doing so,
the Court concluded that a judgment that failed to fix the amount of attorney fees to be
awarded was not afinaljudgment. 2000 UT 45, f 19. The principle of judicial economy
in the appellate process was thus once again upheld.
One year later, this Court again examined Meadowbrook and decided, yet again, to
uphold its approach to thefinaljudgment rule. This time the Court invoked it to bar a
premature appeal. The occasion was Loffredo v. Holt 37 P.3d 1070, 2001 UT 97. In
Loffredo, this Court dismissed an appeal that had been taken of a judgment that had not
yet disposed of a dispute over attorney fees and court costs. Again, this Court
emphasized the need for litigants to conserve scarce judicial resources by complying with
thefinaljudgment rule and not bring an appeal until all contested issues in the case had
been decided at the trial court level.
Loffredo makes clear that onlyfinaljudgments are appealable, and that an appeal
will be dismissed if it is commenced prematurely. In succinct but direct fashion, the
9

Loffredo Court summed up the final judgment rule as follows: "Generally speaking, the
rule prevents a party from prematurely appealing a non-final judgment, and thereby
preserves scarce judicial resources. ... For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must
end the controversy between the litigants. In other words, to be considered a final order,
the trial court's decision must dispose of the claims of all parties.'1 2001 UT 97,ffij1112. Continuing on, the Court added: "We stress that the final judgment rule does not
stand for the proposition that the lower court need only resolve the majority of the claims
for us to entertain the case. Rather, it requires that all claims, including requests for
attorney fees, be decided in order for a decision to be appropriately appealed to this court.
Strict compliance with this principle is necessary to preserve 4the interests] of
judicial economy.'" Id. at ^ 14 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
It is against this backdrop that the instant appeal was commenced. At the trial
court level, Beddoes found himself on the losing end of a motion for summary judgment,
which he wished to appeal. However, within seven days after entiy of that judgment,
Beddoes was hit with a timely request for an award of court costs, which he wished to
oppose. At this juncture, he was confronted with a decision. Should he commence an
immediate appeal of the summary judgment order, which disposed of the underlying
merits of the case but not the collateral issue of court costs, or should he hold off on
appealing the summary judgment decision until after the cost request matter was
resolved? If he chose to file an immediate appeal, would he then have to file a second
appeal if he subsequently received an adverse ruling on the cost request matter, not
10

having the omniscient power to know how this issue would turn out?
Faced with these questions, Beddoes chose the only course consistent with the
spirit, puipose, and intent of the final judgment mle as expressed in Meadowbrook and its
progeny. Before commencing an appeal, he waited for the trial court to end the
controversy between the parties by disposing of the cost request issue. Once this issue
had been adjudicated, Beddoes then commenced the instant appeal.
As it turned out, the court of appeals concluded that Beddoes chose the wrong
course. Remarkably, the court accepted Giffm's argument that the summary judgment
order was the final judgment in the case, not the order disposing of Griffin's request for
court costs. Referring to two cases that state, in dictum, that court costs can be added to a
judgment without effecting its finality,1 the court of appeals concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over Beddoes' appeal.
The decision of the court of appeals is erroneous as a matter of law. Such decision
runs counter to the final judgment mle as expressed in Meadowbrook and its progeny,
and hearkens back to the days of Taylor, requiring litigants to file separate, multiple
appeals to address issues of collateral import. The net effect of the decision is to
undeimine the principle of judicial economy in the appeals process by requiring multiple
appeals in the same case, one devoted to challenging the merits of the case and another

'These cases, Nielson v. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and ProMax
Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000), are discussed more fully in Argument II
below.
11

devoted to challenging a subsequent cost determination.2 To correct this erroneous
application of thefinaljudgment rule, Beddoes respectfully asks this Court to reverse the
decision of the court of appeals.

IL

BEDDOES' APPEAL WAS DISMISSED ON THE BASIS OF
INAPPOSITE CASE LAW AND DICTUM

In dismissing Beddoes' appeal, the court of appeals latched on to certain dictum in
two cases-Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and ProMax Dev.
Coip. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254-to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal. The court of appeals relied upon these cases to establish the following
proposition: "when ... no attorney fees are involved but only court costs, which are
usually small statutory amounts or liquidated amounts, such costs can be added later to a
judgment without affecting its finality." Promax. 2000 UT 4 at ^[12.
With all due respect to the court of appeals, this proposition should not have been

2

Court costs are not "subsumed" in the underlying judgment, as Giffin argued
before the court of appeals by citing to a federal case inteipreting thefinaljudgment rule,
California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 567 (9th Cir.
1991). Giffin's reliance on federal case law was misplaced, because the federal approach
to thefinaljudgment rule was expressly rejected by this Court in Meadowbrook and its
progeny. Beddoes has been unable to find any Utah case law on point. However, in
researching this issue he did find a case from California, Norman I. King Real Estate
Investments, Inc.. v. Praszker. 269 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990), wherein
the following statement is made:fcCApostjudgment order which awards or denies costs or
attorney's fees is separately appealable, ... and if no appeal is taken from such an order,
the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review it." (Citations omitted; copy attached at
Appendix Q)
12

applied to dismiss Beddoes' appeal. While on its face it may seem applicable, upon
closer examination it is actually not. There are sharp, fundamental distinctions between
the instant case and the Nielson and ProMax cases. These distinctions cannot be squared.
As more fully demonstrated below, it was erroneous as a matter of law for the court of
appeals to rely upon the dictum in Nielson and ProMax as a basis for dismissing
Beddoes' appeal.

A.

Nielson Is Inapposite

Simply stated, Nielson is inapposite to the case at bar. In contrast with the instant
case, Nielson involved an appeal arising from a modified judgment. The modified
judgment merely recited, as a clerical matter, that the prevailing party was entitled to an
award of court costs. The nature and substance of the underlying judgment was not
modified in any way. Moreover, it does not appeal* that Nielson involved any dispute
over the recoverability or amount court costs. These are key distinctions between Nielson
and the instant case.
Because Nielson involved a modified judgment, it was disposed of in accordance
with the umodified judgment rule." Under this rule, when a judgment is entered that is
subsequently modified by a later judgment, a detennination must be made as to which
judgment is the final one for puiposes of appeal. In making this detennination, the
modified judgment rule requires an inquiiy into the nature and scope of the modification.
If the modification alters the character and substance of the original judgment, then it
13

becomes the final judgment for puiposes of appeal. However, if the subject modification
is merely clerical in nature, then the original judgment is controlling for puiposes of
appeal. See, e.g.. Nielson. 888 P.2d at 132 (citing cases and authorities applying the
modified judgment rule).
In Nielson, the modification in question merely recited that the prevailing party
was entitled to an award of court costs. No argument was made over the amount of such
costs. Further, no argument was made as to whether such costs were appropriately
recoverable.
The instant case is quite different. Unlike Nielson, no modification of a judgment
is involved. Hence, the instant case is outside the scope of the modified judgment rule.
Equally important, the instant case involves a dispute at the trial court level as to the
appropriateness of an award of court costs. Here, as opposed to Nielson, court costs were
contested and ultimately denied. Consequently, Nielson has veiy little application to the
issues in the instant appeal. It should also be noted that Nielson was decided several
years prior to this Court's seminal decision in Meadowbrook, which fundamentally
altered the landscape in Utah for puiposes of applying the final judgment rule. For the
foregoing reasons, it was en* for the court of appeals to invoke Nielson as a basis for
dismissing the instant appeal.

B.

ProMax Was Misapplied

The court of appeals also erred in applying ProMax to dismiss Beddoes' appeal.
14

As indicated above, ProMax is one of this Court's recent decisions construing the final
judgment rule. It upholds Meadowbrook by requiring strict adherence to the final
judgment rule in order to conserve scarce judicial resources and prevent premature
appeals. Although ProMax refened to Nielson as authority for the proposition that court
costs can be added to a judgment without affecting its finality, such reference was purely
dictum. On balance, the holding of ProMax clearly favors Beddoes' position.
The precise issue in ProMax was whether a judgment that awarded court costs, but
which failed to fix the amount of such costs, was final. Before an appeal had been
commenced, the trial court conducted a hearing on the taxation of costs, and then
awarded court costs and attomey fees to the prevailing party. The court subsequently
modified the judgment to increase the award of attorney fees. In doing so, it omitted any
mention of court costs. An appeal was then commenced, and the issue of appellate
jurisdiction was raised as to which judgment in the case was the final judgment for
purposes of appeal.
Because ProMax involved an appeal from a modified order, the modified judgment
rule was appropriately applied to determine the timeliness of the appeal. In this respect,
the case is similar to Nielson. However, unlike Nielson. the modified judgment was
deemed to be the final judgment, with the Court concluding that the modified judgment
had sufficiently altered the character and substance of the original judgment so as to
delay invocation of the final judgment rule. In arriving at this result, the Court stated:
"Where attorney fees are awarded to a party, whether denominated as an item of 'costs'
15

or not, and the amount is not stated in the judgment rendered on the merits of the case,
and evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial court either by affidavit or live
testimony, there is no final judgment for the purposes of appeal until the amount of the
fees has been ascertained and granted. However, when, as in Nielson, no attorney fees
are involved but only court costs, which are usually small statutory amounts or liquidated
amounts, such costs can be added later to a judgment without affecting its finality."
ProMax, 2000 UT 4 at ^f 12.
Whereas ProMax concerned a dispute over the recoverability of court costs and
attorney fees, the instant case deals only with court costs. Does it then fall within the
scope of the Nielson proposition that court costs can be added to a judgment without
affecting its finality? It does not. This proposition does not apply here for several
reasons. First, court costs were not awarded in the instant case. Instead, Beddoes
vigorously challenged an award of costs. This did not occur in Nielson. Ultimately, the
trial court deemed an award of costs to be improper. Hence, the instant case is veiy
factually different than Nielson. Moreover, the instant case does not involve a modified
judgment, as opposed to the modified judgments at issue in both Nielson and ProMax.
The bottom line is that the superfluous language in Nielson and ProMax addressing the
issue of adding small, undisputed statutoiy court costs to a judgment without affecting its
finality, is simply inapposite to the instant case.
It has long been recognized that tC[t]he right to an appeal is a valuable and
constitutional right [that] ought not to be denied except where it is clear the right has been
16

lost or abandoned." Adamson v. Brockbank. 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947). Beddoes'
constitutional right to pursue an appeal should not be deprived on the basis of such
suspect authority. The memorandum decision of the court of appeals dismissing
Beddoes' appeal is not a correct statement of the law. It guts the final judgment rule as
established in Meadowbrook by undeimining the ability of parties to bring all appealable
issues in a case in a single notice of appeal. The dictum relied upon by the court of
appeals in dismissing Beddoes' appeal was simply misapplied. This Court should
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate Beddoes' appeal.

III.

THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES IN
CONSTRUING THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE

The end result of the memorandum decision of the court of appeals is to create a
distinction between court costs and attorney fees in applying the final judgment rule.
The court of appeals would treat as non-final a judgment that disposes of all issues in a
case except a contioversy over attorney fees. However, the court of appeals would treat
that same judgment as final where it disposes of everything but court costs. On its face,
this distinction appears artificial. It is not only artificial but flawed.
For puiposes of applying the final judgment rule, this Court has already rejected a
distinction between judgments that resolve the merits of a case, and judgments that
resolve subsequent collateral issues of attorney fees. See Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119.
In ProMax. this Court reiterated its opposition to such a distinction, summarizing its
17

stance as follows:
As pointed out in Meadowbrook [959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998)], a
party's decision to appeal the underlying merits may often depend
upon the size of the attomey fees awarded. We there addressed the
appropriate timing for parties' requests for attomey fees. While not
strictly apposite to the instant case, our reasoning there is useful.
Explaining our holding we presented the following model: '[A] party
who appeals the judgment on the underlying merits may also wish to
appeal the attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a motion for
usch fees to be brought after the time for filing an appeal on the
original judgment has expired, the appellant would have to file a
second appeal based upon the attomey fee award. Judicial economy
during the appeals process would not be furthered in any way by
requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a party's decision to
appeal on the underlying merits may largely depend upon the size of
the attorney fee award.' Applied to the instant case, this reasoning is
sound. It will save the resources of the parties and this court if the
issue of attorney fees can be determined in the same appeal in which
the merits of the underlying judgment are examined. Otherwise, a
second appeal must be taken to challenge the amount of attorney fees
awarded subsequent to the judgment on the merits and then examined
in the light of the judgment on the merits. This would be wasteful.
We therefore hold that, in the interest of judicial economy, a
trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a
party before the judgment becomes final for the puiposes of an appeal
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will serve
both litigants and this court well, by c enabling] an appellant to bring
all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of
appeal' Meadowbrook, 959 P.2d at 119.
Proinax, 2000 UT 4,fflf14-15.
If the term "court costs" is substituted in place of the term "attorney fees" in the
foregoing citation, the reasoning, logic, and holding of the case remains exactly the same.
As such, there is no compelling reason for any distinction to be made between postjudgment costs and post-judgment attomey fees. These two collateral issues should
18

receive equal, identical treatment. To hold otherwise is to undermine Meadowbrook and
its progeny, and to wreak havoc with the principle of judicial economy in the appeals
process.
When this Court stated in Meadowbrook that all appealable issues in a case should
be brought in a single notice of appeal, it must be assumed that the Court meant what it
said. Giffin, however, would have this Court alter the wording of Meadowbrook and
have the decision read as follows: all appealable issues in a case should be brought in a
single notice of appeal, except contested issues involving post-judgment court costs,
which should be addressed and handled in second and separate notice of appeal. Giffin's
alternate rendering of Meadowbrook is simply not warranted.
Where costs remain in dispute at the trial court level, this Court should apply the
final judgment rule consistent with Meadowbrook and find that there is nofinaljudgment
in a case until after the dispute is resolved. See Loffredo, 37 P.3d at 1072-73 (concluding
there is no final judgment until attorney fees and court costs are resolved).3
Economically speaking, it makes good common sense for thefinaljudgment rule to be
3

Loffredo provides strong authority for Beddoes' position herein, inasmuch as it
involved court costs and attorney fees still pending at the trial court level when the appeal
was commenced. This Court deemed the Loffredo appeal premature, stating that it
should not have been brought until the controversy between the parties had been brought
to an end. ProMax is similar, in that it involved an appeal arising from a post-judgment
dispute over attorney fees, which the lower court initially taxed as an item of court costs.
Giffin would have this Court either overlook Loffredo and ProMax. or otherwise limit
their holdings to cases where only attorney fees are left unresolved at the trial court level,
as opposed to court costs. Giffm's approach is unsound, and would only create confusion
in the appellate process, not clarity.
19

inteipreted so as to allow a party to challenge a cost request determination in the same
notice of appeal that also addresses the underlying merits of the case. Such a rule would
conserve litigation resources by avoiding duplication in appellate fees ($205 filing fee
instead of $410), duplication in cost bonds ($300 instead of $600), duplication in attorney
fees (which, alone, can be cost prohibitive), and duplication in court resources. This is
particularly important when the amount of costs in controversy is small (e.g., less than
$300 in the instant case). A contrary result would have a chilling effect on litigants who
wish to appeal a small cost award as well as an unfavorable judgment on the merits of the
case, but who cannot economically justify the costs of filing two separate appeals in such
situations.
Cost deteiminations are often appealed. Indeed, on occasion they are important
enough to be the only issue in a case meriting an appeal. See, e.g., Fielden v. Hansen,
2005 UT App 426 (per curiam, unpublished opinion vacating an improperly entered cost
award of $194.88 for trial exhibits (copy attached at Appendix O)). Where, however, a
litigant wishes to appeal both the underlying judgment and an adverse cost award (or,
perhaps more accurately stated, where a litigant may need to appeal both matters), the
most economical, sensible, and expeditious solution is to allow the litigant to appeal both
matters in a single appeal.4
4

Cost requests are required within 5 days after entry of a judgment. Utah R. Civ.
P. 54 (d)(2). This requirement seemingly allows for the lower court to quickly assess the
appropriateness of the request and giant or deny the request in an expeditious fashion.
However, even under the best of circumstances it is unlikely that a contested cost request
20

Simply stated, there is no compelling reason for costs to be treated differently than
attorney iocs. ^,, t ;i manors warrant equal treatment
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guidance to litigants who sometimes struggle with the difficult decision of when to
appropriately commence an appeal.

appeal was timely filed. It should therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals
j 11 • •; •: i nstate Beddoes' appeal forthwith.

CONCLUSION'
The principle of judicial economy in the appeals process would not be served by
distinguishing between post-judgment court costs and post-judgment attorney fees.

will be decided and reduce a 10 judgment within 30 days after entry of the una^ >
ji idgment, considering the initial 5-day time frame permitted for filing the cost ,n, - ^
plus time for mailing, the 10-day period permitted for filing an opposition to the cost
request plus time for mailing, the 5-day period for filing a reply memorandum plus time
for mailing, the time it takes to file a request for a decision, the time it takes tor the court
to rule on the cost request and submit a minute entry on the matter, the time it takes for
the prevailing party to prepare and circulate a proposed order on the matter plus time for
mailing, the 5-day period permitted for the nonprevailing party to file an objection to the
proposed order plus time for mailing, and the time frame for the court to execute the
order, not including any intervening holidays or weekends that may add additional time to
the foregoing time hints, nor factoring any additional time for oral argument or a hearing
to be held regarding the matter. Consequently, under Giffin and the court of appeals'
rationale, a party who wishes to appeal an unfavorable cost award and also contest the
underlying judgment would invariably have to file two separa te notices of appeal in the
case. This is extremely wastefi il.
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Instead of treating these two collateral matters differently, they should be treated the
same. Thus, in deciding whether a post-judgment request for court costs should delay
entry of judgment for puiposes of appeal, this Court should adhere to the final judgment
rule laid down in Meadowbrook and its progeny, and require that all timely presented and
contested collateral matters be first disposed of at the trial court level before appellate
jurisdiction is invoked. This consistent approach to the final judgment mle conserves
scarce judicial resources and allows for all appealable issues to be brought and resolved
in a single notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, this Court should find that Beddoes complied with the final
judgment mle by awaiting disposition of Giffin's timely filed post-judgment cost request,
prior to commencing an appeal. In sofinding,this Court should reinstate Beddoes'
appeal and reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
DATED:

°i b / ° &

MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
William P. Morrison
Grant W. P. Monison
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies thai on ihc "7T"^ day of _ £-t y? ft»^U.i^ , 2006, I caused to be
mailed, first-class and postage-prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
of \ppcllant to the following.
Sean A. Monson
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere
Attorney for Respondent/AppeliiL
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., #300
Salt Lake City, Iff 8H09

MORRISONS MORRISON 1 I

William P. Morrison
Attorney foi Appellant
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I N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
>oOoo
* „* - — .., ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM UEC^S^uL
(Not For Official Publication)
Case ' -

-nnciiS4-CA

v.
(March 30, ?C"^5)

Gary Giffin,
2006 UT App 130

Defendant and Appellee,

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 04 0907525
The Honorabl e A nthony B . Qi ] i n n
Attorneys;

William, P. Morrison and Grant W P, Morrison, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Sean A. Monson, Salt Lake city, for Appellee •

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bi llings

Appe.lee Gary Giffin moves to dismiss this appeal for lack
isdiction and also seeks sanctions under rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedui ^
^ii ~
•.
.
-^., L,.^ ^ . w i ^ w ~~. w entered an order
granting ^^\.>^:\
1,...-. jment and dismissing Beddoes's complaint with
prejudice on the merits. On September 29, 2005, Giffin moved for
an award of costs under rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, On November 2, 2 005, the district court denied the
request in a signed minute entry, Beddoes prepared a formal
order, which was signed and filed on November 28, 2005. Beddoes
filed a notice of appeal from, the summary judgment on December
22, ,2005. Giffin argues that the appeal must be dismissed
because the September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment,
rather than the November 28, 2005 order denying costs, was the
final, appealable judgment.
The jurisdictional issue is addressed in ProMax Dev. Corp.
v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, and Nielson v. Gurley, 88 8
P.2d 13 0 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), In Nielson, we stated that an
amendment to a judgment clarifying that the prevailing party vs •
entitled to recover costs "did not create a new judgment for

purposes of determining the timeliness of appeal, and the time
[for] appeal commenced to run from the date of the original
judgment." Nielson, 888 P.2d at 133. In ProMax, the Utah
Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss an appeal filed after
entry of an order awarding a liquidated amount of attorney fees,
but more than thirty days after the original judgment dismissed
the complaint on the merits. The supreme court concluded:
Where attorney fees are awarded to a party,
whether denominated as an item of "costs11 or
not, and the amount is not stated in the
judgment rendered on the merits of the case,
and evidence must be taken afterwards by the
trial court either by affidavit or live
testimony, there is no final judgment for the
purposes of appeal until the amount of the
fees has been ascertained and granted.
However, when, as in Nielson, no attorney
fees are involved but only court costs, which
are usually small statutory amounts or
liquidated amounts, such costs can be added
later to a judgment without affecting its
finality.
Promax, 2000 UT 4 at 1[l2.
The September 22, 2005 order granting summary judgment and
dismissing Beddoes's claims was the final, appealable judgment.
As the prevailing party, Giffin sought to recover costs under
rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however,
Giffin did not seek an award of attorney fees. The addition of
costs to the judgment, if the request had been granted, would not
have affected the finality of
the September 22 order for purposes
of appeal. Because Beddoes}s notice of appeal was not filed
within thirty days after entry of final judgment, we lack
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
In support of the request for sanctions under rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel for Giffin asserts
that he wrote to counsel for Beddoes stating that the appeal was
not timely and also stating his intention to seek sanctions under
rule 33 if the appeal was not voluntarily dismissed. Beddoes!s
counsel declined to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Giffin seeks
an award of attorney fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous
appeal. Although Beddoes' s arguments are inconsistent with both
ProMax and Nielson, we liberally construe them as good faith
arguments for a modification of the existing case law and deny
Giffin's request for sanctions on that basis.

20051154-CA
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We dismiss the appeal for lack ot jurisdiction but deny the
request for sanctions under ^-' <- "< -^ "he Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

j&**s£M

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

/%***<& *A* ^^tKJL^tju^X/
Pamela T, Greenwood,
As soc iate Pres idina

JudKth M. Hillings, Judge
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es,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case

^7 ,

• L0Q07S7 R

Gary Giffin,
Defendant and Appellee,

ORDER
P i ;i rsuant to Section 7 8- 2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated,
and effeeti ve
twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
Thereafter, al"l further pleadings and correspondence should be
directed to that court. Prior to the effective date of the
transfer, this court is willing to consider retaining this matter
on its own docket. Accordingly, any party to the appeal may
submit a letter to the court regarding the appropriateness of
retention. The letter shall contain a concise statement of the
issues presented on appeal and a brief explanation of the reasons
supporting retention or transfer. The letter shall not exceed
five pages and must be received within ten calendar day s of the
date of this order. In the event the tenth day falls on a
weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the first
business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer, but
this court may, on its own motion, vacate an order of transfer.
This order does not alter or affect the independent requirements
of rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
\\L CO,

H
Date

2.&&S

.^^eK^Pat Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

yf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December ^ , 2005, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
GRANT W. P. MORRISON
WILLIAM PATRICK MORRISON
MORRISON & MORRISON LC
352 E 900 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
SEAN A MONSON
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC
10 EXCHANGE PL
3RD FL NEWHOUSE BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the trial court listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

By L\fr$ffi&T\
Deputy Clerk \-/

l^ J

Case No. 20051154-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 040907525

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURT?
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

JUL • ? 2006

William G. Beddoes,
Petitioner,
Case No. 20060389-SC
20051154-CA

v,
Gary Giffin,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on April 28, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
"Whether a motion for an award of costs, filed after the
entry of judgment, delays the entry of judgment for purposes of
appeal until the motion is resolved."
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
For The C o u r t :

Dated

/% ?fit6

Christine M."Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 18, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
GRANT W. P. MORRISON
WILLIAM PATRICK MORRISON
MORRISON & MORRISON LC
352 E 900 S
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
SEAN A MONSON
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC
10 EXCHANGE PL
3RD FL NEWHOUSE BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN / JODI BAILEY
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this July 18, 2 006.

,<wvgV"~
By
Deputy Clerk

fULe^^v^cU-&--<—)

Case No. 20060389
Court of Appeals Case No. 20051154
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 040907525
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copy
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
&BEDNARLLC
Sean A. Monson, #7261
Third Floor Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Facsimile: (801)364-5678
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM G. BEDDOES,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case No. 040907525

-vsGARY GIFFIN,

Judge Quinn

Defendant.

On Friday, September 2,2005, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing pursuant to notice. PlaintiffWilliam G. Beddoes was represented by counsel, Wffiamrfr
Morrison; Defendant Gary Giffin was represented by counsel, Sean A. Monson. The Court, having
considered the written memoranda submitted by counsel and the oral arguments of the parties, for
good cause appearing, hereby ORDERS as follows:

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint and all
claims asserted therein are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. The Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that Defendant initiated the criminal proceedmg against Plaintiff, as required to assert
a claim for malicious prosecution.
DATED this "22tifcv of September, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
f

HONORABLE^ANTHONY QUTNN
Approved as to form:

William P. Morrison
Attorney for Plaintiff

G \giO06G5\20 BeddoesUudgmcut wpd
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W i l l i a m P. Morrison (7587)
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f
352 E a s t 900 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111
Tel:
801/359-7999

NOV 2 8 2005
By

SALTLAfcS*Ge«NTY
Deputy Clerk

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM G. BEDDOES,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR COSTS

v.
Civil No.: 040907525
GARY GIFFIN,
Judge: QUINN
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on defendant's request for
costs.

The Court, having duly considered the request for costs,

the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the request, and all
other pleadings and documents on file, and oral argument not
having been requested, now for good cause showing it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendant's cost request is
denied.

The requested costs are not recoverable costs under Rule

54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Costs for photo

copies are generally not recoverable, and there is no authority
for awarding costs for transcripts of a c o l l ^ ^ U a g ^ ^ p d i n g .

DATED:

//~''2~^C "Ofc BY

mmi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & NOTICE TO PARTIES:
This certifies that on the tZ^
day of
tJQVt+t^tvL* 2005,
I caused to be served, via first-class mail, postage-prepaid, a
true and accurate copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying
Defendant's Request for Costs to the following:
Sean A. Monson
Manning Curtis Bradshaw
Attorney for Defendant
Third Floor Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

* Notice to interested parties: If you have any objection
to the proposed Order, such objection must be filed within 5 days
after service of this Order upon you. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (2) •
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888 P.2d 130
Parker M. NIELSON, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Dale GURLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 930327-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 21,1994.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 30,1995.
Page 131
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Daniel D. Darger, Salt Lake City, for
appellee.
Before
ORME, JJ.

GREENWOOD,

DAVIS

and

OPINION
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge.
Dale Giirley. an employee of the State of
Utah, appeals the trial court's judgment in favor
of Parker M. Nielson. We vacate the judgment
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
FACTS
Nielson trains hunting dogs as a hobby. To
facilitate his hobby. Nielson obtained a permit
from the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
(DWR) and negotiated a special use lease
agreement with the State of Utah. Division of
State Lands and Forestry, for the purpose of
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for
hunting dog training" During the morning of
September 8. 1990. Nielson was training his
dogs on the leased property with chukar
partridges. Nielson completed his activities and
left the area around 10:00 a.m.
On the same day. Gurley, a wildlife
conservation officer employed by DWR. was
patrolling in the area of Nielson's leasehold,
checking on hunters on the opening weekend of
the hunting season for grouse, chukar. and

r
l a s t : . <?bL

cottontail rabbit. That afternoon, Gurley forcibly
entered a locked bird pen belonging to Nielson.
The pen was part of Nielson's licensed game
farm. As a result of Gurley's conduct, the chukar
within the pen escaped. Gurley then dismantled
a device designed to recapture gamebirds and
rendered the pen unusable. Gurley also
confiscated bird feed, feeders, identification
bands, and watering devices. Gurley did not
secure a warrant and did not make an arrest or
issue a citation.
On September 1SL 1990. a mere ten days
after the incident, Nielson. a licensed attorney,
filed a complaint alleging that Gurley converted
his property, tortiously interfered with his
contract with the State, and defamed him. 1
Upon being served, Gurley prepared a report of
the incident and fabricated a citation against
Nielson, later falsely claiming hi his affidavit in
opposition to Nielson's motion for partial
summary judgment that he mailed the citation to
Nielson. Gurley admitted at trial that he had not
actually issued a citation to Nielson, nor had he
ever intended to do so.
On April 9. 1991. Nielson filed a motion
for partial summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion, holding that Gurley had
acted without probable cause and that his
conduct was unlawful. The trial court also
granted Nielson's motion to strike Gurley's
affidavit because it was "riddled with untruths."
Subsequently, Nielson filed a second action
against Gurley. The two actions were
consolidated, as both involved the same parties.

the same transaction, the same damages, and
identical allegations, except that the second
complaint sought an injunction to prevent
defendant from interfering with plaintiffs dogtraining activities. The case proceeded to trial
after which the court entered judgment against
Gurley for $2300, found to be the replacement
value of Nielson's property, plus $15,000 in
attorney fees pursuant to Utah's bad faith statute.
See Utah Code Aim. § 78-27-56(1) (1992).
Gurley asks us to reverse the trial court's
ruling on numerous grounds, including lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, governmental
immunity, misinterpretation of Utah Wildlife
statutes and regulations, improper entry of
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summary judgment, improper award of attorney
fees to a pro se litigant, and improper award of
bad faith attorney fees. 2
TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
Before reaching the merits of Gurley's
appeal, we must first determine whether we have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Nielson argues that
Gurley failed to file notice of appeal within
thirty days following the trial court's entry of
final judgment, and that we must therefore
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See
Utah R.App.P. 4(a).
Of course, we cannot take jurisdiction over
an untimely appeal. Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d
390. 392 (Utah 1983). In fact, "[w]hen a matter
is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only
the authority to dismiss the action." VarianEimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570
(Utah App.1989). However, "[tjhe right to an
appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and
ought not to be denied except where it is clear
the right has been lost or abandoned." Adamson
v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52. 60. 185 P.2d 264.
268 (1947).
The chronology of the proceedings below is
critical in determining whether we have
C

last ^r/

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. On June 24,
1991. the trial court entered partial summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of
liability. On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was
held on the remaining issues of conversion,
interference with contract, and damages. On
December 18. 1992, the trial court, by
memorandum decision, awarded plaintiff $2300
in damages and $15,000 for attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1)
(1992). On the same day, by minute entry, the
trial court indicated it would "retain jurisdiction
over this matter until the final documents
resolving this case are in place."
Apparently unclear as to whether the
memorandum decision constituted a final
judgment—a peculiar worry in view of die
explicit language of the minute entry--Gurley
filed a notice of appeal from the memorandum
decision on December 21, 1992. On January 7,
1993, the trial court entered judgment awarding
plaintiff $2300 in damages and $15,000 in
attorney fees. On January 27. the trial court
amended the judgment to recite that Nielson was
also entitled to his costs. Gurley filed a second
notice of appeal, from the amended judgment,
on February 26, 1993. Thus, the notice of appeal
Gurley filed on February 26, 1993. was filed
within thirty days from the date the court entered
die amended judgment, but was not filed within
thirty days from the date of the original
judgment. Therefore, the first question presented
by Nielson's motion to dismiss is whether the
thirty-day period for Gurley to file his notice of
appeal began running as of the date the court
entered the original judgment or as of the date
the court amended die judgment.
In Utah, die rule of law governing diis issue
is clear:
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an
amendment or modification not changing the
substance or character of the judgment, such
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which
relates back to the time the original judgment
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for
appeal; but where the modification or
amendment is in some material matter, the time

begins to run from the time of the modification
or amendment.
Adamson, 185 P.2d at 268. Accord In re
Marriage of Mullinax, 292 Or. 416, 639 P.2d
628. 633-34 (1982). See also Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co . 344 U S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 248-49,
97 L.Ed. 245 (1952) (fact that Court amends
judgment in immaterial way does not extend
time within which appellant can seek review):
C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation. Amendment of
Judgment as Affecting Time for Taking or
Prosecuting Appellate Review Proceedings. 21
A.L.R.2d
285,
287. 295-304
(1952)
(summarizing cases addressing calculation of
time for appeal based on whether amendment to
judgment was material or simply clerical).
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In the instant case, the modification or
amendment was purely clerical in nature. The
trial court did not enlarge the award of attorney
fees; instead, the court merely clarified its order
by indicating that Nielson was entitled to his
taxable costs in addition to the $15,000 attorney
fee award. This amendment was not of sufficient
importance to change the character of die
judgment. It did not affect any substantive rights
running to the litigants. Indeed, the court's
amendment to the judgment was completely
unnecessary because costs are awarded as a
matter of course to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise orders. Utah R.Civ.P.
54(d)(1). The effect of the amendment did not
create a new judgment for purposes of
determining the timeliness of appeal, and the
time in which Gurley could appeal commenced
to rim from the date of the original judgment. 3
We next consider whether Gurley timely
filed notice of appeal from the trial court's
original judgment. The trial court issued its
memorandum decision on December 18. 1992
On December 21, 1992. Gurley prematurely
filed his first notice of appeal. The trial court
entered judgment on January 7. 1993 Thus,
Gurlev filed a notice of appeal after die trial
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court announced its decision, but prior to the
court's entry of judgment. Rule 4(c) anticipates
just such a scenario and states that
[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order
but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such
entry and on die day thereof.
Utah R.App.P. 4(c). Therefore, under Rule
4(c), we consider Gurley's notice of appeal to
have been filed as of January 7. 1993-die date
the court entered its judgment-unless the case is
governed by die exception set forth in Rule 4(b).
Rule 4(b) states:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in die trial court by any party
(1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings
of fact, whether or not an alteration of die
judgment would be required if the motion is
granted: (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment: or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of die order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion.... A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
any of die above motions shall have no effect. A
new notice of appeal must be filed within die
prescribed time measured from the entry of the
order of die trial court disposing of the motion as
provided above.
Utah R.App.P. 4(b) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, by motion served on
January 21, 1993, Gurley sought to set aside the
judgment entered on January 7. 1993, and the
findings of fact and conclusions of law7
contained therein. However, Gurley's motion did
not trigger the exception to Rule 4(c) provided
for in Rule 4(b). First, Ourley's motion was not
timely, as he served it more than ten days after
the court entered judgment. See Utah R.Civ.P.
59(e). Second, Gurley wididrew his motion to
set aside on February 26. 1993. and thus the
court neither granted nor denied his motion and

did not enter an order which, under Rule 4(b).
would trigger a new thirty-day appeal time.
For the foregoing reasons, we have
jurisdiction over this appeal.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Gurley contends that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this case because
Nielson failed to comply with the notice
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -1*2
(1993). Nielson counters Gurley's assertion with
a three-prong argument. First, Nielson contends
that his action against Gurley did not invoke the
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act
because Nielson accused Gurley of wrongdoing
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in his individual capacity, as opposed to suing
him for actions taken within the scope of his
State employment. (In the vernacular employed
at oral argument. Nielson contends this is
routine litigation between "ordinary guys.")
Second. Nielson contends that whatever
immunity Gurley otherwise would have has
been waived. Finally, Nielson argues that even if
the Govermnental Immunity Act applies to this
action, he fully complied with the notice
provisions necessary to maintain his action.
A. Action Under Color of Authority
Obviously, a plaintiff can sue a State
employee acting in his or her individual capacity7
without implicating the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. State employees, like other
citizens, engage in a myriad of personal and offduty activities for which they, like other citizens,
may be subject to suit. The Utah Govermnental
Immunity Act recognizes this fact and only
applies to an action against a state employee "for
an act or omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority." Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2). -12 (1993). "
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However, in the instant case, it is clear that
the conduct of which Nielson complains was
conduct that Gurley engaged in while
performing his duties as a State employee and
was done under the color of that authority.
Nielson based his original complaint against
Gurley on allegations that Gurley failed to
comply with regulations pertaining to M[a]ny
peace officer or special function officer."
Moreover, in his answer to the complaint filed
on October 2, 1990, Gurley raised governmental
immunity m several affirmative defenses,
invoking numerous statutory provisions of the
Govermnental Immunity Act. including those
provisions that require a plaintiff to provide
proper notice. Therefore, Nielson was aware,
even from the initial stages of this litigation. 4
that Gurley claimed to have seized his property
under color of the State's authority. Given this
knowledge, Nielson will not now be heard to
complain that the Governmental Immunity Act
does not apply because Nielson only meant to
sue Gurley as an ordinary' individual, not for
any tiling he did in the course of his employment
by the State.
B. Notice a Precondition to Maintaining Action
The failure to comply with the notice
requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act deprives the trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction, and therefore compliance
with the act is a precondition to maintaining an
action "against the state, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment or under color of authority." Utah
Code Ami. § 63-30-12 (1993). See id. § 63-3011; Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828
P.2d 535. 540-41 (Utah App.1992). In Lamarr,
we held that a suit against the State cannot be
maintained unless proper notice is given. 828
P.2d at 542. Moreover, we pointed out that
because improper notice divests the court of
subject matter jurisdiction, failure to provide
proper notice of claim is a non-waivable defense
diat any party, or die court, can raise at any time.
Id. at 540.

Nielson, like the plaintiff in Lamarr, claims
the notice issue is not properly before this court.
However, in Lamarr we rejected the plaintiffs
argument that a state subdivision had waived
compliance with the notice

Utah Code Aim. § 63-30-5(1) (1993)
(emphasis added). Nielson contends that his
claims against Gurley arose out of two contracts
with the State-his lease with the State and his
permit to operate his dog-training activities.
Therefore, Nielson argues that he did not need to
provide notice of claim in order to maintain his
action.
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provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act.
We expressly stated:
Lamarr asserts the notice issue is an affirmative
defense that was not pleaded in the answer, and
thus Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes UDOT from raising it in its
summary judgment motion and on appeal.
Lamarr notes UDOT never mentions the term
"notice of claim" in its answer. He further argues
UDOT did not request the court to rule on this
issue on summary judgment and therefore we
cannot consider it on appeal. Lamarr's argument,
however, misconstrues the nature of the
statutory notice of claim requirement. Lamarr
erroneously asserts the notice of claim provision
is a statute of limitation. Rather, the supreme
court has held the statutory notice requirement is
a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition
to suit. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,
250 (Utah 1988).
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, this part of Nielson's waiver
argument fails.
Nielson further contends that under the
substantive provisions of the Governmental
Immunity Act the sovereign has waived
Gurlev's immunity. Nielson points to two
provisions in the Governmental Immunity Act
that he claims divest Gurley of immunity from
suit. Section 63-30-5 states:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived as to any contractual obligation.
Actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations shall not be subject to the
requirements of [various provisions, including
the notice requirement!.
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However, Nielson ignores the operative
language of the statute that he claims negates the
requirement to provide notice. While the statutes
that extend sovereign immunity include both
entities and individual state employees, see Utah
Code Aim. §§ 63-30-11(2), -12 (1993), section
63-30-5 waives the notice requirements and
substantive immunity for claims arising from
"any contractual obligation" only as concerns
"all governmental entities." Section 63-30-5
does not waive the notice requirements for a suit
against a state employee "for any act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority," Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2), 12 (1993), notwithstanding a nexus between the
claim asserted and "any contractual obligation."
Thus, the waiver of immunity applicable to
contract claims is not applicable to Nielson's
action against Gurley.
Finally, Nielson contends that the
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply
because Gurley acted with malice and thus the
sovereign has waived Gurley's immunity. It is
true that if the employee acted or failed to act
through malice or fraud, the employee cannot
successfully invoke governmental immunity as
an affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-4(3 )(b) (1993). However, Nielson
confuses the scope of the notice requirement
with the extent of substantive sovereign
immunity protection. Complying with the notice
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is
a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition
to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with the
substantive provisions contained within the
Governmental Immunity Act which insulate the
sovereign and its operatives from liability. See
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250"(Utah
1988); Lamarr. 828 P.2d at 540-41. If. as

Nielson argues, a plaintiff need only provide
notice in those situations when the sovereign
may properly invoke immunity under the
substantive provisions of the Act, the notice
requirement would be meaningless 5 because the
substantive provisions of sovereign immunity
would fully protect the sovereign and its
operatives in any event.
We conclude that Gurley's immunity was
not waived and that Nielson had to comply with
the notice provisions of the Governmental
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Immunity Act in order to maintain his action
against Gurley.
C. Failure to Comply with Notice Provisions
In order to comply with die Utah
Governmental Immunity Act,
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for
an act or omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority shall
file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993)
(emphasis added).
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
(1993) provides that
[a] claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim arises,
or before the expiration of any extension of time
granted under Section 63-30-11. regardless of
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whether or not the function giving rise to the
claim is characterized as governmental.
In the instant case, Nielson's claim arose on
September 8, 1990, when he discovered Gurley
had dismantled and seized his property. Nielson
filed his first complaint against Gurley on
September 18. 1990. However. Nielson did not
file a notice of claim with the Attorney General
or the Division of Wildlife Resources prior to
initiating this legal action. On October 2, 1990.
Gurley answered Nielson's complaint and, by
referring to die statutory provisions concerning
notice, raised plaintiffs failure to comply with
those provisions as an affirmative defense. On
June 24. 1991. the trial court entered partial
summary judgment against Gurley on the issue
of liability. Nielson filed a second action against
Gurley based on the same conduct in September
of 1991, almost one year after the cause of
action arose. The two actions were consolidated
on August 13, 1992.
On September 3, 1991. within the one-year
period prescribed by statute. Nielson apparently
endeavored to comply with die notice
requirement by sending a copy of his complaint
and notice of claim to the Division of Wildlife
Resources. However, to comply with the notice
requirement, Nielson was also required to send
notice of claim to the Attorney General within
the one-year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 6330-12 (1993); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541. It was
not until December 4, 1991, that Nielson sent
notice of claim to die Attorney General. 6 The
notice was deficient, however, in diat it came
more than one year after the claim arose, and
such deficiency was fatal to die trial court's
jurisdiction. See. e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716
P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam): Sears v.
Soudiworth, 563 P.2d 192,194 (Utah 1977).
CONCLUSION
We have jurisdiction of Gurley's appeal.
We conclude diat Nielson's failure to provide
timely notice of claim as required by Utah Code
Ann §§ 63-30-11. -12 (1993) deprived the trial
court of subject matter jurisdiction over

Nielson's claims against Gurley. Accordingly,
^e vacate the trial court's judgment.
DAVIS and GREENWOOD. JI, concur.

1 Nielson did not pursue the defamation claim at
trial.
2 Because we hold that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, we
do not reach the other issues Gurley raises on
appeal.
3 Even if we are incorrect, and the appeal time
runs from entry of the amended judgment, we
would still have jurisdiction over this appeal
because Gurley filed a notice of appeal within
thirty days from entry of the amended judgment.
4 Such awareness became increasinglyunavoidable as the action progressed. On April
22, 1991, Gurley filed an affidavit expressly
stating that he dismantled the bird pen pursuant
to his authority as a law enforcement officer.
Moreover. Gurley attached a citation to his
affidavit alleging Nielson violated laws and
regulations pertaining to die taking, possession,
and releasing of wild game birds. Although
Gurley's affidavit was stricken from the record
as being "riddled with untruths," it did serve to
put Nielson on actual notice that Gurley claimed
to have acted as a state employee. Indeed, when
Nielson filed yet a tliird action, one alleging civil
rights violations that was later removed to
federal court, he expressly recognized that "[t]he
conduct of... Gurley was performed under color
of various statutes, ordinances, regulations,
customs or usages of the State of Utah."
Therefore, Nielson's claim that he sued Gurley
in his individual capacity, as an ordinary citizen,
and was unaware that Gurley acted as a wildlife
enforcement officer, is untenable.
5 We have recently discussed the several
purposes the notice requirement is intended to
serve. See Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666. 671
(Utah App. 1994).

c
last, -i:

6 Nielson contends that he complied with the
notice requirements by serving notice of claim
on both the Attorney General and the DWR
within the one-year period. However, die record
does not support Nielson's claim. In order to
have complied with the notice requirements,
Nielson must have filed two notices of claimone with the agency concerned and the second
with the Attorney General~by September 8,
1991. See generally Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d
666 (Utah App. 1994). While the record does
indicate that Nielson timely served notice of
claim on Gurley and DWR, the record is devoid
of proof of service of any timely pre-suit notice
on the Attorney General. Nielson claims he sent
a copy of the proposed complaint to the
Attorney General on August 14, 1991. However,
Nielson can point to nothing in the record to
support this claim and readily admits that the
December 4, 1991, notice he sent to the
Attorney General was done because he
"anticipated] that the ... first and second notices
were defective."
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RUSSON, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
Defendants Edward Flower and Lauretta
Pelton appeal the trial court's denial of their
post-trial motion for attorney fees that they filed
five days after the jury returned a verdict in their
favor but before entry of final judgment. We
reverse.
BACKGROUND
The facts are undisputed for purposes of
this
appeal.
Meadowbrook,
LLC
("Meadowbrook"), which owns Meadowbrook
Mobile Home Park, brought an action to evict
defendants, alleging that they had failed to
comply with certain mobile home park rules and
that their lease should therefore be terminated.
At trial the jury found that defendants had
complied with the mobile home park rules and
rendered a verdict in their favor.
Under section 12 of defendants' lease and
under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency
Act, 1 the prevailing party in an eviction suit
such as the one brought by Meadowbrook is
entitled to attorney fees. Although defendants in
their answer pled for an award of costs and
attorney fees for defending the lawsuit, they
failed to raise their claim to, or offer evidence

C

of those fees during the trial. Instead, five days
after trial but before entry of final judgment,
defendants moved for attorney fees. 2 The trial
court denied the motion, concluding diat (1)
defense counsel's failure to present evidence at
trial as to attorney fees and counsel's failure to
move the court to allow such evidence to be
presented after trial resulted in a waiver of any
claim to tiiose fees, and (2) defense counsel
could not move the court for attorney fees after
trial unless the issue had been specifically
reserved during trial.
On appeal, defendants argue that a request
for attorney fees may be made for the first time
by post-trial motion. Although Meadowbrook
does not deny that defendants were entitled to
attorney fees under the lease and under the
Mobile
Home
Park
Residency
Act
Meadowbrook argues that a claim for attorney
fees must be supported by evidence that is
introduced at trial and that failure to present
evidence of such fees during trial constitutes a
waiver of all rights to claim those fees any time
in the future.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's conclusion that a request for
attorney fees is waived if not made at trial is a
legal conclusion. We review a trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness, granting no
deference
to die trial judge's legal
determinations. See State v.
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Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994): Society of
Separationists. Inc. v. Taggart. 862 P.2d 1339.
1341 (Utah 1993).

motions are disposed of or after the time for
filing such motions has expired.

ANALYSIS

Id. at 624 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). 3

The issue in this case is whether a
prevailing party waives its right to attorney fees
if it fails to present evidence of attorney fees or
move the court during trial to allow evidence of
such fees to be presented after trial.
The general rule in Utah is that subject to
certain exceptions, a part)- is entitled to attorney
fees only if authorized by statute or by contract.
See Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 885
P.2d 759. 782 (Utah 1994): Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985. 988 (Utah 1988).
However, the exact deadline as to when a party
must raise a claim to attorney fees or be deemed
to have waived any claim to such fees is subject
to debate. Both defendants and Meadowbrook
rely upon Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622
(Utah 1985). In Cabrera, this court held that a
party who failed to request all attorney fees
incurred for trial work during the "trial phase" of
a case could not request such fees for the first
time after the case had been remanded to the
trial court for the sole purpose of determining
attorney fees incurred in defending the case on
appeal. Id. at 624. We reasoned:
[AJ part}' who is entitled to attorneys fees and
costs and fails to ask for all of them in the trial
phase of the case, or fails to adduce adequate
evidence in support of a finding of reasonable
attorneys fees, waives any right to claim those
fees later.... It is not consistent with judicial
economy to allow a party to apply for additional
fees for trial work, whether in an independent
hearing, in a separate suit, or at a hearing to
determine an award of attorneys fees for
necessary appellate work. Once the matter is
litigated, or could have been litigated, a party
may not later come into court to seek an
additional award. Therefore, an attorney will
have to estimate fees for work done on post-trial
motions or ask the trial court to schedule a
hearing on attorneys fees either after post-trial

Defendants argue that the "trial phase" of a
case includes timely post-trial motions, while
Meadowbrook argues that the "trial phase" ends
with the rendering of the \erdict and the
dismissal of the jury. We did not clearly
establish in Cabrera or in any other case when
the "trial phase" ends. While that term may have
different meanings in different contexts, the time
is ripe for a clear rule with respect to the issue
presented in this case. Thus, for reasons set forth
below, and in the narrow context of determining
when a prevailing party waives its right to
attorney fees, the "trial phase" ends, not with the
rendering of the jury's verdict, but with the
signed entry of final judgment or order, at which
time trial issues become ripe for appeal and a
party may file a timely notice of appeal pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4
Several policy reasons support such a rule.
First, in most instances, requiring all parties to
present evidence of attorney fees to a jury before
resting (heir cases would contravene judicial
economy. Where a contract or statute provides
for attorney fees to the prevailing party, a party
does not even become entitled to such fees until
the jury has determined which party has
prevailed in the case. Thus, a would-be losing
party who submits evidence of its attorney fees
to the jury increases costs to all parties and
wastes judicial time and resources. This is
especially apparent in complex litigation
involving multiple parties.
Second, the determination of reasonable
attorney fees is an issue generally left to die
sound discretion of the trial court, not the jury.
See Salmon v. Davis Comity. 916 P.2d 890. 897
(Utah 1996) (Russon. J., dissenting): Dixie State
Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; see also
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47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 59 (1995); 20 C.J.S. Costs
§ 125 (1990). Because the issue of attorney fees
is generally ancillary to die underlying action, a
trial court's decision regarding the award of such
fees normally requires an inquiry separate from
the main cause of action to be proved at trial—
"an inquiry that cannot even commence until
one party has 'prevailed.1 " White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec, 455 U.S.
445, 452, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325
(1982): see also McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc.,
1 F.3d 1306. 1314 (2d Cir.1993); Garcia v.
Burlington Northern R.R., 818 F.2d 713, 721
(10th Cir.1987). The trial court's decision in this
regard is wholly independent of the jury:
therefore, the prevailing party should be entitled
to move the court for attorney fees after the jury
has rendered its verdict and been discharged.
Third, there must come a time of closure, or
finality, in a case when a claim for attorney fees
must be raised or waived. That time is the signed
entry of final judgment. See Fair Housing
Advocates Ass'n v. James, 114 Ohio App.3d
104, 682 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (1996) (holding
that party must either present evidence of
attorney fees at trial or move for award of fees
before court issues final judgment). Defendants
urge this court to adopt the "universal rule" in
other jurisdictions, which permits a timely posttrial motion for attorney fees. Some of the
jurisdictions defendants cite allow motions for
such fees to be filed after entry of final
judgment, while others allow motions to be filed
after the time for filing an appeal has expired. 5
However, neither approach fosters the most
sensible and expeditious appeals process.
To illustrate, a party who appeals the
judgment on the underlying merits may also
wish to appeal the attorney fee award. In
jurisdictions that allow a motion for such fees to
be brought after the time for filing an appeal on
the original judgment has expired, the appellant
would have to file a second appeal based upon
the attorney fee award. Judicial-economy during
the appeals process would not be furthered in
any way by requiring such piecemeal appeals.
Moreover, a party's decision to appeal on the
underlying merits may largely depend upon the
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size of the attorney fee award. See T & G
Aviation, Inc. v. Footh, 792 P.2d 671, 672
(Alaska 1990) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that allowing party to file motion for
attorney fees seventy days after entry of
judgment is unreasonable and that motion
should generally be brought within ten days after
entry of judgment because losing party may base
its decision on whether to appeal on size of
adverse award of attorney fees). 6
Similarly, in those jurisdictions which
permit a motion for attorney fees to be brought
within thirty days after entry of judgment (the
time during which an appeal may be filed in
many jurisdictions), the moving party could
delay filing the motion until die time for filing
an appeal has nearly expired. Thus, the appellant
may have to move die court for an extension of
time to appeal in order to adequately address the
issue of the attorney fee award in the original
appeal. 7 Or, as already mentioned, if die trial
court
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cannot award attorney fees until after the time
for filing die original appeal has expired, the
appellant would have to file a second appeal if it
decides to challenge the award. Absent a rule or
statutory provision to die contrary, the rule we
adopt today prevents a party from bringing a
post-judgment motion for attorney fees and will
generally enable an appellant to appeal all
issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a
single notice of appeal. 8
Meadowbrook argues that Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). does not
permit a party to make a post-trial motion for
attorney fees. In Girard, die plaintiff-lessor
brought an action to declare forfeiture of a lease
on the ground that die defendants had failed to
obtain liability insurance coverage as required
by the terms of the lease agreement. While the
plaintiffs complaint contained a demand for an
award of attorney fees incurred in enforcing the
lease agreement, the plaintiff rested her case
without presenting evidence in support of her

claim for such fees. The trial court, however,
reopened the case sua sponte to allow the
plaintiff to submit evidence with respect to
attorney fees which the plaintiff omitted at the
time of trial. This court vacated and set aside the
award of attorney fees, holding that a trial court
has no discretion to reopen a case sua sponte.
We reasoned:
Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial
system of conducting trials precludes the court
from infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy.
Counsel is entitled to control the presentation of
evidence, and should there be a failure to present
evidence on a claim at issue, it is generally
viewed as a waiver of the claim.
Id. at 247. We further stated, "[T]he
interests of justice are not enhanced when the
court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out
and deciding an issue that would otherwise be
dead, it not having been litigated at the time of
trial." Id.
We recognize that our language in Girard
with respect to attorney fees was overly broad.
Thus, for die reasons set forth above, we
disavow any implication in Girard that a
prevailing party must litigate the issue of
attorney fees before resting its case or waive any
claim to such fees where they are to be
determined by the trial court. 9 Indeed, attorney
fees are routinely established by proffer or
affidavit, 10 and by evidentiary hearing when
necessary.
We emphasize, however, that a prevailing
party must be prepared to address the issue of
attorney fees at the court's convenience. If the
court directs the parties to address the issue
before the close of evidence, before the
rendering of the jury verdict, or at any other time
the court deems appropriate, the prevailing party
must comply. Therefore, our holding in this case
is narrowly tailored: a prevailing party that files
a motion for attorney fees before signed
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entry of final judgment or order does not waive
its claim to such fees, unless otherwise provided
by statute or unless it fails to comply with the
court's order to address the issue at a specific
time.
We further emphasize that prudent trial
counsel should always preserve the issue of
attorney fees, as well as any other issues not
disposed of during trial, before resting their
cases, thereby allowing the court to address the
issue at the court's and the parties' convenience.
Trial counsel who fail to preserve an issue,
opting instead to raise the issue for the first time
in a post-trial motion, simply gamble that their
motion will be filed before entry of final
judgment. In the case before us. defendants
moved for attorney fees prior to the signed entry
of final judgment; therefore, their motion was
timely, even though it was filed five days after
the jury rendered its verdict. While the trial court
did not enter final judgment until nearly four
months after the jury verdict had it done so
before counsel filed the motion for attorney fees,
defendants would have waived their claim to
those fees.
Because we hold in defendants' favor,
defendants are also entitled to reasonable
attorney fees incurred in this appeal. See R & R
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc.. 936 P.2d
1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (where party entitled to
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, award of
attorney fees on appeal is proper); Management
Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d
406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that contract
provision allowing for attorney fees includes
those fees incurred on appeal as well as at trial).
11
CONCLUSION
Because defendants moved for attorney
fees before signed entry of final judgment, diey
did not waive their claim to such fees. We
therefore reverse the trial court's denial of
defendants' motion and remand the case for the
puqx>se of determining the reasonable attorney
fees to which defendants are entitled.

HOWE, C.J., and DURHAM. Associate
C I . and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN. J I .
concur in Justice RUSSON'S opinion.

6 The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended in 1997 and now provide that a motion
must be filed within ten days after the date
shown on the judgment. Alaska R. Civ. P.
82(b)(4)(c).

1 See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-8.

7 See Utah R. App. P. 4(e).

2 Final judgment was not entered until nearly
four months after the jury returned its verdict.

8 Some statutes provide that attorney fees shall
be taxed as costs. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §
14-2-1(5) (attorney fees in action upon bond in
private contract); § 14-2-2(3) (attorney fees in
action for failure to obtain bond in private
contract); § 34-27-1 (attorney fees in suits for
wages); § 38-1-18 (attorney fees in suits
enforcing mechanic's liens); § 63-56-38(5)
(attorney fees in suit upon payment bond in
construction contract); § 78-45f-313(2) (attorney
fees in actions under uniform interstate family
support act). Generally, under these statutes
attorney fees may be included in a cost
memorandum, which may be filed and served
within five days after entry of final judgment, as
prescribed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d).

3 On remand, the trial court in Cabrera awarded
attorney fees for work related to post-trial
motions, preparation of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and an order and judgment,
in addition to fees incurred defending the case
on appeal. 694 P.2d at 624.
4 See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A; Utah R. App. P. 4.
5 See, e.g.. T & G Aviation, Inc. v. Footh, 792
P.2d 671. 672 (Alaska 1990) (upholding award
of attorney fees where motion for such fees filed
for first time seventy days after entry of
judgment); Sperry v. Bolas, 786 P.2d 517, 518
(Colo.Ct.App. 1989) ("Since a request for
attorney fees may be considered after the entry
of judgment we conclude the trial court erred in
denying plaintiffs request on the ground that
judgment had been entered and that, therefore,
the request was made too late."); Cheek v.
McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So.2d 977, 979
(Fla.1987) ("Therefore, we hold that proof of
attorney's fees whether such fees are provided
for by statute, or by contract may be presented
for the first time after final judgment pursuant to
a motion for attorney's fees." (citation omitted));
Touchdown Sportswear, Inc. v. Hickory Point
Mall Co., 165 Ill.App.3d 72, 116 Ill.Dec. 25.
518 N.E.2d 647, 648 (1987) ("[W]here fees were
pleaded and are an entitlement to the prevailing
party, the failure to reserve the issue should not
bar a petition for attorney fees filed within 30
days of judgment."); Fanners his. Exch. v.
Pickering.* 104 Nev. 660. 765 P.2d 181. 182
(1988) ("Absent a specific statutory provision
governing the time frame in which a party must
request attorney's fees, the timeliness of such
requests, we conclude, is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court.").

f

last ;.-.

9 Parties may agree to submit the issue of
attorney fees to a jury. See First Gen. Servs. v.
Perkins, 918 P.2d 480. 483 (Utah Ct.App.1996).
Moreover, in certain circumstances, attorney
fees may be considered an item of consequential
damages to be decided by a jury. See Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey,*781 P.2d 414, 419-20
(Utah 1989). Our rule in this case does not apply
where the issue of attorney fees is to be decided
by the jury. In such circumstances, evidence of
such fees must be presented to the jury
according to established trial procedure.
10 See Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rules 4-505
& 4-505.1; see also IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon.
776 P.2d 607. 617-18 (Utah 1989) (affirming
trial court's award of attorney fees which court
based on affidavit because attorney's initial
proffer was insufficient); Walther v. Walther,
709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985) (affirming
attorney fee award based upon proffer not
challenged by adverse party); Muir v. Muir, 841
P.2d 736. 742 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (holding that
trial court abused discretion in reducing attorney

fee award where proffered evidence of fees was
adequate and entirely undisputed).
11 As a peripheral matter, we address an issue
that relates to appellate procedure before this
court. In support of their argument that under the
"universal rule." requests for attorney fees made
for the first time by post-trial motions are timely,
defendants' brief contains a series of citations to
other jurisdictions. One of those cases upon
which defendants rely. Downs v. Stockman, 555
So.2d 867 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989). was quashed
by Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835
(Fla.1991). The Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure require that "[ajll briefs [under rule
24] be concise, presented with accuracy ... and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, mimateriai or
scandalous matters." Utah R.App. P. 24(j). The
process of "Shepardizing" a case is fundamental
to legal research and can be completed in a
maimer of minutes, especially when done with
the aid of a computer. Though we do not
consider counsel's actions to be egregious in this
case, we admonish all attorneys to ensure the
validity of all cases presented before this court.
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Chief

3 After entering into the agreement, the Railes
purchased a building lot with money obtained
from the sale of their previous home. They also
obtained a $300,000 construction loan, hi about
May of 1994, ProMax began constructing the
home. Its goal was to have the home completed
by October I, 1994, so that it could be exhibited
in the Parade of Homes, a sale promotion
sponsored by home builders. When the Railes
expressed concern over the cost of the home.
Bates assured them that ProMax could build the
home within the $300,000 budget because it was
going to be in the Parade of Homes and
suppliers would therefore provide ProMax with
discounts
of
up
to forty
percent.

Justice:

INTRODUCTION
1 Plaintiff ProMax Development Corporation
appeals from a judgment dismissing its
complaint against defendants Rick and Martha
Raile for mechanic's lien foreclosure, breach of
contract.
and
unjust
enrichment.

4 In about August of 1994, Bates told the Railes
that ProMax would need additional money to
complete the home. They applied for additional
financing and were approved for a takeout loan
of $330,000. The home was completed by
October 1 and was exliibited in the Parade of
Homes. A closing on die permanent home loan
was scheduled for October 12, but prior to
closing, Bates again told the Railes that ProMax
needed more money to cover construction costs.
The Railes then agreed to pay an additional
$33,505.32 to ProMax as full and final payment
for the home construction. On ProMax's behalf.
Bates then signed documents confirming that
ProMax would accept the payment from the
Railes as a final payment. He also signed a
statement for a title company acknowledging die'
total payoff amount, a lien guaranty certifying
diere were no outstanding amounts owed for the
home construction, and a lien waiver
relinquishing all lien rights to the home.

BACKGROUND
2 We state the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Railes, who were the prevailing
party below. During the spring of 1994. Rick
and Martha Raile, a married couple, verbally
agreed to hire ProMax Development
Corporation to build a home for them for
$300,000 excluding the lot and landscaping. The
agreement was made between the Railes and
their longtime friend. Phil Bates, one of
ProMax's
principals.
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5 At the closing, all necessary papers were
signed, and ProMax received a check for
$33,505.32 as payment in full for constructing
the home. Following the closing, however, Bates
approached the Railes and asked them to sign a
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC")
representing diat ProMax needed to provide it to
the bank. Rick Railes signed die document, even
diough the purchase price and financing
amounts were left blank, and per Bates' request.
Rick back-dated the REPC to April 20. 1994.

Bates then presented Martha Railes with the
REPC for her signature, but when she expressed
concern because the document did not list the
purchase price and financing amounts. Bates
told her that he would fill in the amounts later by
putting in the numbers the bank needed to see.
6 At some point after the Railes signed the
REPC, Bates filled in the blank lines for the
purchase and financing amounts. He listed the
total purchase price of the home as $508,000.
including a fictitious $30,000 earnest money
deposit and $80,000 the Railes supposedly paid
to
ProMax
for
die
building
lot.
7 Approximately one week after the closing.
Bates lold the Railes that they owed ProMax an
additional $5,000 for a lot reservation fee and
landscaping. The Railes paid the money. Several
weeks later. Bates told the Railes that they owed
ProMax an additional amount exceeding
$136,000 for constructing the home. This time
the Railes refused to pay any additional monies,
and ProMax responded by filing a mechanic's
lien and this suit. Specifically, ProMax sought
the mechanic's lien foreclosure, damages for
breach of contract, and recovery for unjust
enrichment.
8 The parties agreed to a bench trial, and after
the close of the evidence, the trial court found in
favor of the Railes. It concluded diat the
documents the Railes signed at the loan closing
proved that an accord and satisfaction had
occurred, and it dismissed ProMax's complaint
with prejudice. The judgment, entered on
October 1, 1997. provided in part that
plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with prejudice
and upon the merits, with costs being awarded to
the defendants after an appropriate hearing on
taxation of costs as provided by Section 38-1-18,
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), said
judgment to bear interest at the legal rate until
paid.
9 Subsequently, the Railes moved for the
taxation of costs, and after a hearing, the trial
court entered an order on December 1. 1997.
awarding them $7,656 for the fees of one of
C

their attorneys, plus $1,336.10 in court costs, for
a total of $8,992.10. The court denied any award
of attorney fees for a second attorney who had
represented die Railes, stating diat his affidavit
lacked "die specificity necessary to sustain an
award of attorney fees." Ten days later, the
Railes moved to alter or amend the order to
increase the award of fees to $28,291.50.
apparently to cover the fees of the second
attorney and a third attorney who had previously
represented them. The court partially granted the
motion by an order on February 9, 1998.
rescinded its December 1 order, and increased
die Railes' award of attorney fees to $20,791.50.
No mention was made of die $1,336.10 in court
costs. ProMax filed a notice of appeal on
February 13, 1998. assailing die judgment
insofar as it holds diat die Railes proved an
accord and satisfaction. Promax has not raised
the issue of the award of attorney fees to die
Railes. The Railes cross-appeal, assigning as
error die failure of die trial court to award them
the $1,336.10 in court costs and $7,500 in
attorney fees paid to the third attorney.
ANALYSIS
I.

JURISDICTION

10 The Railes move to dismiss ProMax's appeal
as being filed untimely. They argue diat die trial
court entered final judgment on October 1, 1997,
but ProMax did not file its notice of appeal until
February 13. 1998. long past the thirty days
prescribed for filing by Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a). The Railes assert: (1) die
October 1 judgment was a final judgment as
required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3
and is appealable because it disposed of the
merits of die action; (2) their post-trial motions—
to have die amount of attorney fees determined
and costs taxed-dealt with a different matter,
collateral to the merits of die action: and (3) the
orders of the court on December 1, 1997. and
February 9, 1998. did not change or alter the
October 1. 1997. judgment in any respect and
therefore did not prevent that judgment from
being final on the date of its entry, diereby
starting the appeal time to run. They rely on
Nielson \. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.

1994), where the court of appeals held that the
amendment of a judgment to award the
prevailing party court costs did not interrupt the
running of the thirty-day appeal time.
11 We deny the motion to dismiss ProMax's
appeal. In Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52,
185
P.2d
264
(1947), we
stated:
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an
amendment or modification not changing the
substance or character of the judgment, such
entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which
relates back to the time the original judgment
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for
appeal; but where the modification or
amendment is in some material matter, the time
begins to rim from the time of the modification
or
amendment.
112 Utah at 60, 185 P.2d at 268 (emphasis
added). The two orders made on attorney fees
subsequent to the October 1 judgment were
modifications or amendments hi a "material
matter." The first order awarded the Railes
$7,656 in attorney fees, and the second order
increased that amount to $20,791.50. These
amendments were materially different from the
amendment made in Neilson v. Gurley, where
the modification or amendment was to recite that
the prevailing party was entitled to court costs.
As die court of appeals pointed out in that case,
the amendment did not "affect any substantive
rights running to the litigants. Indeed, the court's
amendment to the judgment was completely
unnecessary because costs are awarded as a
matter of course to the prevailing party unless
the court otherwise orders." 888 P.2d at 133
(citing
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)).
12 Utah Code Aim. 38-1-18. which governs the
award of attorney fees in this case, provides that
in any action to enforce a mechanic's lien, "the
successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee. to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action." Where attorney fees are awarded to a
party, whether denominated as an item of
"costs" or not, and the amount is not stated in die
judgment rendered on the merits of the case, and
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evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial
court either by affidavit or live testimony, there
is no final judgment for the purposes of appeal
until the amount of the fees has been ascertained
and granted. However, when, as in Neilson, no
attorney fees are involved but only court costs,
which are usually small statutory amounts or
liquidated amounts, such costs can be added
later to a judgment without affecting its finality.
13 We are aware that in Taylor v. Hansen. 958
P.2d 923, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). the court of
appeals adopted the rule enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.
Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1998). The Court
held that a decision on the merits is a final
decision for purposes of appeal, whether or not
diere remains for adjudication a request for
attorney fees or a determination of the amount of
the fees. We decline to follow that rule. Instead,
we follow the principle set out in Meadowbrook,
LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1998).
14 As pointed out in Meadowbrook, a party's
decision to appeal on the underlying merits may
often depend upon die size of die attorney fees
awarded. See id. We there addressed the
appropriate timing for parties' requests for
attorney fees. While not strictly apposite to the
instant case, our reasoning tiiere is useful.
Explaining our holding, we presented the
following
model:
[A] party who appeals die judgment on the
underlying merits may also wish to appeal die
attorney fee award. In jurisdictions that allow a
motion for such fees to be brought after die time
for filing an appeal on the original judgment has
expired, the appellant would have to file a
second appeal based upon the attorney fee
award. Judicial economy during the appeals
process would not be furthered in any way by
requiring such piecemeal appeals. Moreover, a
party's decision to appeal on the underlying
merits may largely depend upon the size of die
attorney
fee
award.
Id. Applied to the instant case, this reasoning is
sound. It will save the resources of the parties

and this court if the issue of attorney fees can be
determined in the same appeal in which the
merits of the underlying judgment are examined.
Otherwise, a second appeal must be taken to
challenge the amount of attorney fees awarded
subsequent to the judgment on the merits and
then examined in the light of the judgment on
the merits. This would be wasteful.
15 We therefore hold that, in the interest of
judicial economy, a trial court must determine
the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party
before the judgment becomes final for the
purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3. This holding will serve
both litigants and this court well, by "enabling]
an appellant to appeal all issues, including an
award of attorney fees, in a single notice of
appeal" Meadowbrook. 959 P.2d at 119.
16 The rule which we adopt is consistent with a
prior order entered by this court in this case,
ProMax originally filed a notice of appeal on
December 12, 1997, but later voluntarily moved
to dismiss that appeal after die Railes moved the
trial court on December 11 to alter or amend its
December 1 order awarding attorney fees.
ProMax apparently recognized that there had not
yet been a final determination as to the amount
of attorney fees to which the Railes were
entitled. In that order, this court stated:
Plaintiffs motion to withdraw notice of appeal
without prejudice is hereby granted. This court
has no jurisdiction over the appeal, inasmuch as
defendants have a motion pending before the
trial court which renders the judgment entered
by the trial court non-final. A new appeal must
be filed within thirty days after the trial court
enters a formal order on defendant's motion. See
Swenson Assocs. Architects v. State. 889 P.2d
415
(Utah
1994).
II.

ACCORD

AND

SATISFACTION

17 ProMax contends that the trial court erred in
holding that the lien waiver, final payoff
disclosure, and other mortgage documents
generated at closing amounted to an accord and
satisfaction between ProMax and the Railes. We
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review the trial court's ruling for correctness
18 When the Railes orally contracted with
ProMax to construct a home for them, the
agreed-upon cost, according to the Railes, was
$300,000. Several months later. ProMax
demanded more money to complete the
construction. The Railes' applied for an
additional loan to cover ProMax's increased
building costs. After die home was completed.
ProMax again asked the Railes for more money
to cover construction costs. To expedite closing
and move-in dates, the Railes agreed to make
one final payment to ProMax in the amount of
$33,505.
19 At closing. ProMax signed various
documents confirming diat die $33,505
represented the Railes' final payment to ProMax.
These documents included a loan payoff
statement for First American Title Co. and a lien
guaranty certifying that there were "no unpaid
bills for materials or labor furnished for the
construction
and erection,
repairs
or
improvements" to the Railes1 home. ProMax also
signed a lien waiver which stated tiiat upon
negotiating die Railes' check for $33,505,
ProMax "waives, releases and relinquishes all
right of lien or claims payee now has to date
upon the property described below," and
"warrants and guarantees diat payment in full
has been made by payee to all laborers and
suppliers of labor and all materials to said
premises
incurred
to
date."
20 ProMax contends that these documents do
not meet the requirements for an accord and
satisfaction. "An accord and satisfaction arises
when the parties to a contract agree diat a
different performance, to be made in substitution
of the performance originally agreed upon, will
discharge the obligation created under the
original agreement." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v.
Mamas. 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted). A party seeking to prove an
accord and satisfaction must show (1) an
unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over
die amount due: (2) a payment offered as full
settlement of die entire dispute; and (3) an
acceptance of die payment as full settlement of

the dispute. See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen.
706 P.2d 607. 609-10 (Utah 1985).
21 In this case, we find that there was evidence
from which the trial court could find that the
requirements of an accord and satisfaction
between ProMax and die Railes were met. There
is no question that there was a dispute between
the two parties as to tlie amount of money the
Railes owed ProMax for constructing tlie home.
According to the Railes, ProMax was to
construct the home for a total cost of $300,000.
ProMax contended that the actual price agreed
upon was the construction cost plus an
additional $50,000 builder's fee. Tlie dollar
amount ProMax was charging the Railes for tlie
home construction changed several times during
tlie construction period. Documents presented at
trial show that ProMax claimed the Railes owed
amounts which ranged from $300,000 to
$382,000. Significantly, die amount that the
Railes owed ProMax wras a disputed issue
almost from the beginning of tlie construction
relationship.
22 Second, we find that the evidence supports
the trial court's finding that a final payment
amount was offered, accepted, and agreed upon
by the parties as a full resolution and satisfaction
of the disputed amount owed. With the total
amount due in dispute, die parties offered and
agreed to one final payment by the Railes in the
amount of $33,505. This is evidenced by the
testimony in tlie record and by several
documents presented at trial showing that tlie
Railes' payment to ProMax of $33,505 was a
total payoff and satisfaction of the disputed
amount of money owed for tlie home
construction. It is of no consequence that there is
no one written document signed by both ProMax
and die Railes evidencing an accord and
satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction need not
be in writing. See Golden Key Realty. 699 P.2d
at 732. The documents which were signed at
closing by tlie parties, when considered together
with die testimony they presented, provide
evidence that supports tlie conclusion that an
accord
and
satisfaction
took
place
23 ProMax contends that the evidence presented
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was insufficient to support the trial court's
conclusion that an accord and satisfaction had
occurred. However, when the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the Railes.
there is evidence to support the trial court's
ruling in favor of the Railes. Simply because
ProMax presented evidence that diere was no
accord and satisfaction between tlie parties,
claiming instead that diere was a "side
agreement" for more money, does not mean that
the Railes' evidence of an accord and
satisfaction is insufficient to support the trial
court's
ruling.
24 ProMax points out that after the Railes closed
on their home loan, the Railes entered into the
REPC with ProMax which listed die price of the
home at $508,000. ProMax asserts that this
writing was the last of many documents
executed by die Railes, and that it supersedes all
prior documents, proving that die cost of the
home exceeded what the Railes had paid.
ProMax contends that even if there was an
accord and satisfaction at closing between die
parties, the REPC signed later constitutes a
waiver of that accord and satisfaction. We
disagree.
25 On the day of closing, a loan officer for
Chase Manhattan Bank told ProMax diat it
needed a written document reflecting the terms
of its agreement with the Railes. Thereafter,
ProMax asked die Railes to sign die REPC and
back-date it. Rick Raile signed the REPC even
though the contract was left blank as to purchase
price and financing amounts, and back-dated it
April 20, 1994. When ProMax asked Martha
Raile to sign die REPC. she expressed concern
about signing the document because the
purchase price and financing amounts had not
yet been written on die REPC. Despite her
concerns, Mardia Raile signed die REPC after
Bates told her, "Don't worry. Mardia, I'm going
to fill it in after, just to put the amounts to what
the bank needs to see." At some point after the
Railes had signed the REPC, ProMax completed
the contract, showing die purchase price of
$508,000, less amounts already paid.
26 The background of the REPC calls its

credibility into question. There was evidence
that it was neither a contract between the parties
nor proof that an accord and satisfaction had not
occurred. The Railes executed the REPC after
the closing on their home, and they were led to
believe that ProMax would "just put in the
amounts the bank needs to see." However,
ProMax wrote incorrect figures on the REPC
and then attempted to use it to support its claim
that the Railes owed more money. We agree
with the trial court that the REPC has no legal
bearing relative to an accord and satisfaction
between
the
parties.
III.

TRIAL

BY

MOTION

27 Following an initial two-day trial, the trial
court and the parties participated in a telephone
conference during which die parties stipulated
that "[d]ue to the busy nature of the Court's
docket, the issue of accord and satisfaction will
be addressed by die parties through wTitten
briefs." The court went on to state that the briefs
should be "styled as defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment," and it enumerated filing
deadlines for motions and reply memoranda.
28 Per the stipulation, the parties filed their
respective motions and memoranda with the
court. ProMax now contends that the trial court
erred by ruling against it because there were
material issues of fact in dispute at the time of
the court's ruling. We find no error. The
stipulation to wiiich ProMax voluntarily agreed
does not state that the trial court would treat the
motions as motions for summary judgment:
rather, it stated that the case would be submitted
through written briefs styled as motions for
summary judgment. In this, die trial court was
apparently referring to the briefing schedule and
procedure, which includes an initial motion and
memorandum, a motion and memorandum in
opposition, and a reply memorandum. Other
than following the briefing procedure of a
typical motion for summary judgment, there is
nothing to indicate that the trial court considered
the stipulation as a motion for summary
judgment. The initial brief the Railes submitted
was styled as "Defendant's Supplemental Trial
Brief." not as a motion for summary judgment.
C
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This procedure was simply a continuation of the
trial. On disputed facts, the trial court ruled
against
ProMax.
IV. VIABILITY OF ADDITIONAL CLAIMS
29 Finally, ProMax contends that if we conclude
that the trial court did not err in ruling that an
accord and satisfaction occurred, its claims
against the Railes for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment were still viable and should
not have been dismissed. ProMax relies on an
appraisal of the Railes' home that was for an
amount hi excess of what they paid ProMax. We
find no merit to diis argument. The market value
of the home is of no consequence. The relevant
factor is the existence of an accord and
satisfaction. The trial court's determination,
which we have affirmed, that the parties settled
dieir dispute with an accord and satisfaction
subsumes ProMax's claims for breach of
contract
and
unjust
enrichment.
V. COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
30 On their cross-appeal, die Railes contend that
the trial court erred by not granting them their
court costs. The Railes submitted a
memorandum claiming $1,336.10 in court costs.
Promax made no objection. The December 1
order awarded diose costs to die Railes, along
with $7,656 in attorney fees. In the February 9
order, which rescinded die December 1 order,
the attorney fees were increased to $20,791.50.
and the court costs previously awarded were not
mentioned. It appears that diis was done
inadvertently. Therefore, we remand diis case to
the trial court to review its order of February 9.
1998, to determine whether the Railes should
ha\e been awarded costs in the amount of
$1,336.10.
31 The Railes next contend thai die trial court
abused its discretion in failing to award them
$7,500 in attorney fees for the services of a diird
attorney. The court reasoned that the attorney's
affidavit originally submitted was inadequate
and that the attorney had failed to supplement it
even upon the court's invitation to do so. In fact,
the attorney had supplemented his fee affida\it.

Because we are in doubt regarding whether these
fees were inadvertently denied or whether the
trial court had some other basis for denial we
remand this issue for reexamination by the trial
court.
32 Additionally, we hold that the Railes are
entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending
their judgment on this appeal. They were the
"successful party" in the trial court and on
appeal to this court. Our law provides that a
party which successfully defends an appeal that
arose out of a cause of action under a mechanic's
lien is entitled to the attorney fees spent on
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 38-1-18: see also
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development
Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980);
Richards v. Security Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d
606. 612 (Utah Ct App. 1993). However, the
Railes are not entitled to fees in pursuing their
unsuccessful motion to dismiss this appeal.
CONCLUSION
33 We hold that this court has jurisdiction over
this appeal. The evidence supports the judgment
that an accord and satisfaction occurred between
the parties. Therefore, we affirm in part and
remand for reexamination of the denial of court
costs and $7,500 in attorney fees. Additionally,
the trial court shall fix reasonable attorney fees
awardable to the Railes for defending the
judgment on appeal, but not in pursuit of its
motion
to
dismiss
the
appeal.
34 Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice
Stewart, Justice Zimmerman, and Justice Russon
concur in Chief Justice Howe's opinion.
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BONNIE LOFFREDO AND DONALD A. WESTENSKOW, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES,
v.
SCOTT W. HOLT, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
[3]
No- 20000170
[4]
Utah Supreme Court
precludes the enforcement of an unsigned
contingent fee agreement. The district court
concluded
that the agreement was unenforceable
[5]
and granted Westenskow's summary judgment
November 09. 2001
motion. On appeal, Holt contends that rule
1.5(c) does not establish the contractual
elements required to form a valid contingent fee
agreement. We decline to address this issue,
16]
however, because we lack jurisdiction. The
appeal before us is not from a final judgment.
Attorneys: R. Scott Waterfall. Catherine F.
Nor does it qualify for an exception to the final
Labatte, Ogden, Utah, for plaintiffs. Leonard E.
judgment rule. As a result, we dismiss this case
McGee. Bountiful, Utah, for defendant.
without reaching its merits.

[7]

[10]

The opinion of the court was delivered by:
Durrant, Justice.

BACKGROUND

[8]
First District. Brigham City The Honorable
Thomas Willmore

[9]
^1 This case involves a dispute over attorney
fees between Scott Holt and his former clients.
Donald Westenskow and Bonnie Loffredo. The
central question presented is whether rule 1.5(c)
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

f
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[11]
%2 Following a car crash that resulted in the
death of their daughter, Westenskow and
Loffredo hired attorneys to represent them in a
wrongful death action. Loffredo retained Holt as
her attorney and entered into a contingent fee
agreement with him. This signed contract stated
that Holt would receive twenty-five percent of
any
recovery
obtained
before
the
commencement of a lawsuit and thirty-three
percent of any recovery garnered thereafter. The
agreement also included a dispute provision. It
declared that in the event a legal proceeding was
necessary to enforce the terms of the contract.

the defaulting party would be liable for
reasonable attorney fees and costs.

[12]
IP Westenskow initially asked anodier attorney
to represent him in the suit, but later retained
Holt. Holt did not reduce the terms of his
representation to writing at the outset, although
he and Westenskow orally agreed that
Westenskow would pay die same contingent fee
percentage as Loffredo. Following this oral
agreement. Holt mailed a written contingent fee
agreement to Westenskow. Wcstenskowr did not
sign the written agreement or return it to Holt.

[13]
1(4 Subsequently, Farmer's Insurance Exchange
filed a declaratory relief action, naming
Westenskow and Loffredo as defendants.
Farmer's Insurance demanded relief from the
district court because it was one of three
insurance companies potentially responsible for
providing insurance coverage in the wrongful
death action contemplated by Westenskow and
Loffredo. Eventually, the three insurance
companies settled with Westenskow and
Loffredo, and tendered payment via three
separate checks. As each check was received.
Holt deducted thirty-three percent of the money
for himself and withheld that amount as his fee.
He apportioned the remaining proceeds between
his two clients., with seventy percent going to
Loffredo and thirty percent to Westenskow. In
accepting die settlement money, both
Westenskow and Loffredo signed three separate
settlement statements. The signed statements
noted that Holt was retaining thirty-three percent
of the recovered funds.

[14]
^!5 Thereafter. Loffredo and Westenskow sued
Holt, contending that he was not entitled to
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withhold thirty-three percent of the total amount
recovered and demanding that he disgorge the
funds. Westenskow argued that Holt was not
entitled to collect a contingent fee because he
never signed a written agreement with Holt.
Loffredo
alleged that Holt knowingly
misrepresented die terms of the written
contingent fee contract she had signed. She
maintained that Holt should have been limited to
a twenty-five percent recovery. The total amount
that Loffredo and Westenskow demanded
equaled $45,000.

[15]
1f6 Following die submission of summary
judgment motions by both sides, the district
court ruled in favor of Westenskow and against
Loffredo. The court decided as a matter of law
that a valid contingent fee agreement did not
exist between Westenskow and Holt because
rule 1.5(c) of die Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct required such agreements to be in
writing. Nevertheless, the trial court afforded
Holt an opportunity to recover a reasonable
hourly fee for die time he had spent on
Westenskow's case. It ordered Holt to prepare an
accounting of his services and submit die
statement within twenty days. Holt failed to
meet diat deadline, delivering time estimates to
the court three months after the order was
issued. Due to the delay, die trial court held diat
Holt was not entitled to collect any fee from
Westenskow and awarded Westenskow the fees
Holt had retained plus interest.

[16]
117 With respect to Loffredo's contention diat
Holt deducted an excessive fee percentage, the
trial court granted Holt's summary judgment
motion. It held that Loffredo was obligated to
pay Holt a contingent fee of thirty-three percent,
concluding that she agreed in writing to pay the
higher fee percentage if a lawsuit was filed.

[17]

[21]

T[8 Despite its various summan' judgment
rulings, the district court did not completely
dispose of all the summary judgment claims
made by the parties. In particular, the trial court
failed to address Holt's claim that he was entitled
to additional attorney fees and costs from
Loffredo for being forced to defend the terms of
the contingent fee agreement in court.

I. HOLT'S APPEAL IS NOT TAKEN FROM A
FINAL JUDGMENT

[18]
T|9 Holt now appeals the district court's summary
judgment order, arguing that Westenskow was
not entitled to reimbursement and that Loffredo
should have been ordered to pay him reasonable
attorney fees and costs. Westenskow and
Loffredo respond that we lack jurisdiction to
hear this appeal.

[22]
1)11 We have repeatedly affirmed die viability of
the final judgment rule as a barrier to our
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bradbury, 2000 UT at \
10; A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co.. 817
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991): Williams v. State,
716 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1986). Generally
speaking, the rule prevents a party from
prematurely appealing a non-final judgment, and
thereby preserves scarce judicial resources. See
Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534,
535 (Utah 1979). The rule saves this court from
having to deal with "piecemeal appeals in the
same litigation." Id. Where the final judgment
rule is not satisfied, the proper remedy for this
court is dismissal. See A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at
325.

[19]
ANALYSIS
[23]
[20]
f 10 This court does not have jurisdiction over an
appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment,
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), or qualifies for an
exception to the final judgment rule. Bradbury v.
Valencia. 2000 UT 50, f 9, 5 P.3d 649. Here,
Holt appeals the district court's summary
judgment order. *fnl He contends that we have
jurisdiction over his appeal because the
summary judgment order constituted a final
judgment under section 78-2-2 of the Utah
Code. It is undisputed, however, that a claim
brought by Holt seeking attorney fees and costs
from Loffredo is still pending before die trial
court. We therefore conclude that the judgment
from which Holt appeals is not final and must be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

f 12 For an order to constitute a final judgment,
it must end the controversy between the
litigants. See Kennedy. 600 P.2d at 536. In other
words, to be considered a final order, the trial
court's decision must dispose of the claims of all
parties. Bradbury, 2000 UT at If 10. A judgment
is not final if the trial court has failed to
determine whether attorney fees should be
awarded. This is the precise issue we resolved in
ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile,
concluding as follows: "[A] trial court must
determine the amount of attorney fees awardable
to a party before the judgment becomes final for
the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3." 2000 UT 4 , ^ 15, 998
P.2d 254.

[24]
C
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HI3 Our holding in ProMax governs the
outcome of this case. Here, besides claiming that
he had a contractual right to deduct thirty-three
percent of the settlement recovery as his fee.
Holt's summary' judgment motion asked the
district court to award him reasonable attorney
fees and costs from Loffredo. The district court
never resolved this claim. Accordingly, the
judgment from which Holt appeals is not final.

requirements of rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Pate v.
Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah
1984). Second, we have jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders when a party obtains our
permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 5:
Bradbury., 2000 UT at H 12. Finally, we can
entertain a non-final judgment if an appeal is
permitted by statute. Bradbury, 2000 UT at H 12.

[25]
[28]
1114 The only argument Holt has advanced
supporting his assertion that this appeal is from a
final judgment is that the trial court ruled upon
"the majority of the issues." We stress that the
final judgment rule does not stand for the
proposition that the lower court need only
resolve the majority of the claims for us to
entertain the case. Rather, it requires diat all
claims, including requests for attorney fees, be
decided in order for a decision to be
appropriately appealed to this court. See id.
Strict compliance with this principle is necessary
to preserve "the interests] of judicial economy."
Id. If we adopted Holt's position, we would
essentially gut the final judgment rule of much
of its practical meaning and effectiveness.
Consequently, the appeal at issue is not taken
from afinaljudgment and we cannot sustain our
jurisdiction under that rationale.

1116 The appeal before us neither complies with
those procedures specified for certification under
rule 54(b), see Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), nor
satisfies the requirements set forth for an
interlocutory appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 5.
Moreover, there is no applicable statute granting
an exception, hi fact, Holt does not even allege
that any of the exceptions apply. Hence, none of
the exceptions provide us with a legitimate
reason for hearing diis appeal.

[29]
CONCLUSION

[30]
[26]
II. HOLT'S APPEAL DOES NOT QUALIFY
FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE FINAL
JUDGMENT RULE

[27]
II15 We next consider whether Holt's appeal
qualifies for an exception to the final judgment
rule. Three possible exceptions exist. See
Bradbury, 2000 UT at ^ 12. First, non-final
judgments merit our review if the three
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HI7 For the reasons articulated above, we
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to reach the
merits of this case. The mere assertion by Holt
that his appeal is taken from a final order is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this
court. Because the summary judgment order
from which Holt appealed left his request for
attorney fees and costs unresolved, his appeal is
not from a final judgment. Moreover, none of
the exceptions to the final judgment rule apply
to the instant action. Accordingly, we dismiss
this appeal without prejudice and remand it to
the district court for further proceedings.

[31]
"[18 Chief Justice Howe. Associate Chief Justice
Russon. Justice Durham, and Justice Wiikms
concur in Justice Durrant's opinion.
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Opinion Footnotes

a
[32]
*fnl Loffredo has not appealed the district
court's summary judgment order in favor of
Holt.
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Betty Fielden, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Brent C Hansen, Defendant and Appellee.
Case No. 20041058-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Filed October 6, 2005.
(Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, 010907198, The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki.
Carlos J. Clark, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Kristin VanOrman, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court exceeded the permitted range of discretion in
awarding costs for two trial exhibits to Brent C. Hansen.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) governs awards of costs and provides that "costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Under this
rule, the party who claims costs must submit a memorandum including "the items of his costs and
necessary disbursements in the action." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). "A trial court's decision to award the
prevailing party its costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT
98,TJ10, 17 P.3d 1122 (citing Young v. State, 2000 UT 91,14, 16 P.3d 549).
Hansen sought and obtained an aw?ard of costs incurred for preparation of enlarged photographic and
medical exhibits used at trial. "That [Hansen] chose to have these documents reproduced on poster board
does not make them a 'necessary disbursement' under rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,^24, 31 P.3d 1147.
Page 2
To the contrary, '"trial exhibits are expenses of litigation and not taxable as costs.'" Id. at f25 (quoting
Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at ^14) (additional citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the district court
exceeded the permitted range of discretion in awarding costs for the two trial exhibits in the amount of
$194.88.
Accordingly, we vacate the award of costs for trial exhibits.
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.
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[220 Cal.App.3d 39] Michael Waughtei
Roberts, Helfrich & Waughtei, John F. Klinkert,
San Francisco, for plaintiff, respondent and
cross-appellant.
James M. Hanavan, Diane R. Crowley,
Gordon & Rees, San Francisco, for defendants,
appellants and cross-respondents.
SMITH, Associate Justice.
We consider an appeal by defendants
Roman Praszker and West and Praszker
Realtors, Inc. (collectively Praszker) and a
cross-appeal by plaintiff Norman I. Krug Real
Estate Investments, Inc. arising from a judgment
of the superior court in favor of Krug and
against Praszker in the sum of $27,144.73. The
judgment was rendered after the court found that
Praszker, who listed property on which Krug
held an unrecorded deed of trust, was negligent
in failing to disclose the existence of Krug's
security interest to a prospective buyer or to
inform Krug beforehand of the impending sale.
BACKGROUND
Krug is a California corporation operated
by Norman I. Krug (hereafter both are referred
to as Krug), engaged in the business of making
real estate investments. In 1978 Krug and Dr
Robert A. Gilbert acquired a multi-unit
apartment building at 445 Webster Street San
Fiancisco (445 Webster). The parties agreed that
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they would operate the property as an equal
partnership, with Dr. Gilbert assuming
responsibility for managing the property.
Subsequently, Gilbert spent approximately
$90,000 of his own funds on the property and
requested reimbursement from Krug for half of
the amount. Krug balked at the request, and the
parties ultimately agreed that, rather than
reimburse Gilbert, Krug would deed Gilbert his
share of the property in return for a promissory
note secured by a third deed of trust in the
amount of $90,000. However, if Gilbert paid
Krug $40,000 before February 1, 1984, the note
would be considered paid in full.
At the time the agreement was signed, the
parties orally agreed that Krug would forgo
recording his third deed of trust in order to allow
Gilbert to [220 Cal.App.3d 40] refinance the
property. In March of 1981, the property was
refinanced and Krug received the sum of
$17,919.41 toward payment of the note.
Encountering financial difficulties, Gilbert
went into default on a number of properties he
owned, including 445 Webster. He therefore
contacted an old acquaintance Roman Praszker,
sole owner of West and Praszker Realtors, Inc.,
for the purpose of listing the properties for sale.
He told Praszker of Krug's unrecorded deed of
trust and, in substance, asked Praszker to "take
caie of everything," including the deed of trust.

Praszker agreed. On December 14, 1981,
Praszker listed the subject property for sale.

and preventing Plaintiff from recording its Third
Deed of Trust."

On January 6, 1982, Krug and Praszker had
a telephone conversation in which Praszker
informed Krug that a sale of 445 Webster to the
Eftil Corporation was pending and advised him
that if he intended to protect his third deed of
trust he should record it. Krug said he would
think about it, and Praszker gave him the name
of the title company handling the transaction.

The court ruled that Krug was entitled to
recover the $40,000 balance due under the note
at the time of the sale to Noble Group, plus 12
[220 Cal.App.3d 41] percentinterest, less the
$17,919.41 previously received by Krug from
the refinance proceeds and the $11,000 Krug
collected from the bankruptcy settlement, for a
total judgment of $27,144.73. After a subsequent
motion to tax costs, the trial court allowed Krug
to recover $8,379 in attorneys fees and
$2,012.60 in costs incurred in his pursuit of Dr.
Gilbert in the state and bankruptcy courts.
Praszker filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment alone. Krug filed a cross-appeal.

The contract of sale to the Eftil Corporation
expressly disclosed the existence of Krug's third
deed of trust, but the sale collapsed. One month
later, however, the property was sold to the
Noble Group, with Praszker acting as the realtor
for both buyer and seller. At no time did
Praszker inform Krug of the pending sale to
Noble, nor did he tell Noble of the existence of
Krug's unrecorded lien.
The property was sold to Noble Group for
$1 above existing recorded encumbrances, but
the fair market value of the property at the time
was actually far greater. Upon learning that the
property had been sold, Krug filed suit against
Dr. Gilbert
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to collect the balance on the promissory note.
Gilbert declared bankruptcy on February 8,
1984, and Krug's attorneys pursued the claim in
the bankruptcy court, resulting in a cash
settlement of $11,000.
On March 18, 1985 Krug filed suit against
Praszker. Although the case proceeded to trial
on a number of theories, the court rendered
judgment for Krug strictly on negligence
grounds. The court found that "[wjhatever
Plaintiffs motivation was previously in not
recording its Third Deed of Trust, Defendants'
failure to disclose and failure to inform Plaintiff
of the impending sale effectively extinguished
Plaintiffs security interest in the subject
Property, thus proximately damaging Plaintiff
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APPEAL
I
Statute of Limitations **
II
Duty of Care
Praszker contends that under the facts
found by the trial court he owed no duty of care
to Krug as a matter of law, or if he had such duty
it was discharged by the January 1982
conversation in which he advised Krug to record
his deed of 1 rust.
The term "duty" is only an expression of
policy considerations that lead the law to say
that a particular plaintitt is entitled to protection.
(De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transportation
Co. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 782, 794, 225
Cal.Rptr. 789; Thompson v. County of Alameda
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 749-750, 167 Cal.Rptr.
70, 614 P.2d 728.) The existence of a legal duty
is a question of law for the court. (Leger v.
Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688;
Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27
Cal.3d at p. 750, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d
728.)

Praszker does not dispute that he knew of
Krug's unrecorded third deed of trust and of the
proposed sale to Noble Group at a price which
would not cover Dr. Gilbert's indebtedness to
Krug, but claims there was no duty of disclosure
with respect to the Noble transaction. He urges
at the outset that he had no privity of contract
with Krug and therefore had no special
relationship which would create a legal
obligation toward him. However, "a defendant
can be liable for economic harm inflicted upon a
third party with whom he has no direct dealing,
provided that the [220 Cal.App.3d 42]
consideration of appropriate factors warrants the
imposition of a duty to the third party." (Seeley
v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 860,
237 Cal.Rptr. 282.)

the third party suffered injury, the moral blame
attached to the broker's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm. (Op. cit. supra, at pp.
157-158; see generally J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 804, 157 Cal.Rptr. 407,
598 P.2d 60; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49
Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16.)

Civil Code section 2343 entitled "Agent's
responsibility to third persons" provides that
"One who assumes to act as an agent is
responsible to third persons as a principal for his
acts in the course of his agency, in any of the
following cases.... [p]'s ... 3. When his acts are
wrongful in their nature." (Emphasis added.)

The most important step in determining if a
broker owes a duty of care to a third party is to
examine "whether a reasonable person would
have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to
the third person and whether in view of such risk
the broker exercised ordinary care under the
circumstances." [220 Cal.App.3d 43] 2 Miller &
Starr at p. 158.) Here, Praszker knew that his
client Dr. Gilbert had fallen on financial hard
times and was in default on 445 Webster; he also
knew that Krug held an unrecorded security
interest in the property; he knew or certainly
should have known that the sale to Noble Group
would not satisfy the outstanding indebtedness
to Krug and that there was a significant risk that
Krug's security would be destroyed if the sale
went through without disclosure to the buyer or
Krug. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Praszker
kept both the buyer and Krug in the dark about
the sale, resulting in Krug's loss of his security.
Praszker had obviously earlier understood the
importance of his obligation of disclosure as
exemplified by his conduct with respect to the
proposed sale to Eftil Corporation. However, he
chose to remain silent about the subject on the
second sale. Both the policy of preventing future
harm and considerations of moral blame compel
the imposition of a duty on the part of a realtor
never to allow a desire to consummate a deal or
collect a commission to take precedence over his
fundamental obligation of honesty, fairness and
full disclosure toward all parties. " 'The real

California cases recognize a fundamental
duty on the part of a realtor to deal honestly and
fairly with all parties in the sale transaction.
(Nguyen v. Scott (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 725,
735, 253 Cal.Rptr. 800; Easton v. Strassburger
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 90, 100-101, 199
Cal.Rptr. 383; Hale v. Wolfsen (1969) 276
Cal.App.2d 285, 292, 81 Cal.Rptr. 23.) "There is
little question that a real estate broker owes a
duty of care to third persons in the transaction,
where the
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brokei does not have privity with, or fiduciary
duties to, such third person. The question is the
extent of that duty that will be imposed on the
broker." (2 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d
ed. 1989) (Miller & Starr), § 3.27, p. 157.) This
question is answered by weighing a number of
factors, including the extent the transaction was
intended to affect the third party, the
foreseeability of harm, the degree of certainty
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The imposition of a duty on a realtor to
disclose a known unrecorded lien interest is
supported by standards already existing in the
industry. The Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Realtors 2 provides that a realtor
has an obligation to treat fairly all persons to the
transaction (Article 7) and to assure that all
financial obligations and commitment be
reduced to writing (Article 20).

estate broker is brought by his calling into a
relation of trust and confidence. Constant are the
opportunities by concealment and collusion to
extract illicit gains.... He is accredited by his
calling in the minds of the inexperienced or the
ignorant with a knowledge greater than their
own.' " (Easton v. Strassburger, supra, 152
Cal.App.3d at p. 100, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383, quoting
Roman v. Lobe (1926) 243 N.Y. 51, 54-55, 152
N.E. 461.) As stated in the Preamble to the
National Association of Realtors' Code of
Ethics, "The term REALTOR has come to
connote competency, fairness, and high integrity
resulting from adherence to a lofty ideal of
moral conduct in business relations. No
inducement of profit ... can justify departure
from this ideal." We hold that Praszker owed a
duty to disclose to Noble the existence of the
third deed of trust or inform Krug of the
impending escrow. Although expert testimony is
not determinative on the subject, it is noteworthy
that all three experts who testified at trial agreed,
at least in principle, with this conclusion.
We do not accept Praszker's argument that
he fulfilled his obligation of fairness by
informing Krug in January 1982 of the proposed
sale to Eftil. When the listing was originally
taken, Praszker substantively promised Dr.
Gilbert that he would
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"take care of everything" including Krug's third
deed of trust. Once that sale fell through and a
new escrow was opened, Praszker's duties of
disclosure arose anew. As a result of his silence,
Noble was allowed to take the property free and
clear of the Krug deed of trust and his security
interest was destroyed. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court's determination that the
duty was breached.
[220 Cal.App.3d 44]
III
Contributory Negligence
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In response to Praszker's request for a
finding on the issue, the trial court's statement of
decision declares that "[t]he facts do not support
an allocation of damages between Plaintiff and
Defendants under the doctrine of comparative
negligence." Praszker argues that this finding is
irreconcilable with the evidence and the facts as
found by the court. We agree.
We recognize that the question of
contributory negligence is ordinarily one for the
trier of fact and becomes a question of law only
if the evidence is of such a character that it will
support no other legitimate inference. (Simmons
v. Wexler (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1012,
156 Cal.Rptr. 810; Hiner v. Hubbard (1966) 240
Cal.App.2d 63, 69, 49 Cal.Rptr. 157; Shoemaker
v. State of California (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d
379, 386, 20 Cal.Rptr. 812.) However, this is
one of those rare cases where the undisputed
evidence, coupled with the finding of trial court
concerning
the
January
6
telephone
conversation, permits no other legitimate
conclusion.
Krug testified that he discovered in
November 1981 that Dr. Gilbert had fallen
behind on his payments and that a notice of
default had been recorded by the second
mortgage holder. He wrote several letters to
Gilbert and Gilbert's attorney voicing his alarm
at the situation and concern that action be taken.
He received no response. Contrary to Krug's
denial, the trial court made a specific finding
that on January 6, 1982 Praszker told Krug of
the pending sale of the Property to Eftil and
advised him that if he intended to protect
himself he should record the deed of trust. Krug,
however, did nothing.
Civil Code 1714 states the basic principle
that everyone is responsible for injury to another
caused by his want of ordinary care, " 'except so
far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.'"
(Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804,
816, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.) The
adoption of comparative negligence was
intended to vindicate the rationale behind the
statutory maxim that " 'persons are responsible

for their acts to the extent theii fault contributes
to an injurious result.' " (Id., at p. 828, 119
Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226.)
As a result of the January conversation,
Krug knew there was an escrow pending and
that a sale could close at any time, posing a
genuine danger that he would not be paid.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, he was [220
Cal.App.3d 45] wholly indifferent to the
imminent danger presented to his unrecorded
lien. Krug's own expert Harry Miller minced no
words in expressing his opinion when
questioned on the subject: "Q. Isn't it your
opinion, Mr. Miller, that if Mr. Krug had spoken
with Mr. Praszker and Mr. Praszker told Mr.
Krug to record his action [sic] and Mr. Krug did
not, that Mr. Krug would then have some
responsibility for his failure to act? [p] A. Yes.
In fact, with that knowledge, Mr. Krug would
have to be an idiot not to react." (Emphasis
added.)
Krug's complete failure to take any sort of
action to protect his security, such as monitoring
the pending sale, recontacting Praszker, or
recording his deed of trust constitutes a failure to
exercise ordinary care in the management of his
affairs as a matter of law. Consequently the trial
court erred in failing to apportion the damages
suffered by Krug to the extent by which they
were proximately caused by his own negligence.
The amount of such apportionment, however, is
a factual issue which is best left to the trial court.
IV
Attorney's Fees
Praszker next challenges the court's award
of attorney's fees to Krug incurred
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in prosecuting his suits against Dr. Gilbert in
state and federal court, based upon the "tort of
another" doctrine. (See Gray v. Don Miller &
Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 505, 198
Cal.Rptr. 551, 674 P.2d 253; Prentice v. North
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Amer. Title Guar. Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618,
620-621, 30 Cal.Rptr. 821, 381 P.2d 645.) The
order allowing such fees is not reviewable here
however, because no appeal was taken from it.
There is no judgment in this case awarding
Krug "litigation costs as an element of his
damages.~Kather, attorney's fees and related
costs in the Gilbert matter was included in
Krug's cosTbill and the issue of whether Tlrug
was entitled to such sums was deferred until
after judgment and litigated by way of aTnotion
to tax costs. 3
On May 5, 1988 the court filed an amended
judgment, which awarded Krug $273JJ4/Z.3lplus
interest in compensatory damages. Four days
later, [220 Cal.App.3d 461 the court filed its
"Order In re Motion Taxing Costs," in which it
denied Praszker's motion to tax the claimed
litigation'costs. Notwithstanding the rendition of
^iT~poffiudgiT^T"order, Praszker's notice of
appeal expressly limits itself to the May 5
judgment. No appeal was ever taken trom the
May 9 order.
"If a judgment or order is appealable, an
aggrieved party must tile a timely appeal or
forever lose the opportunity to obtain appellate
revise" (Eisenberg, Horvitz & Wiener, Cal.
Practice Guide, Civil Appeals and Writs (Rutter
1989) (Eisenberg), § 2.13, p. 2-5, citing Code
Civ. Proc. § 906 and Kinoshita v. Horio (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967, 231 Cal.Rptr. 241,
emphasis original.) A postjudgment order which
awards or denies costs or attorney's fees js
separately appealable. (Eisenberg, § 2:156, p. 242; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 223, 226
Cal.Rptr. 265; Rich v. City of Benicia (1979) 98
Cal.App.3d 428, 432, 159 Cal.Rptr. 473; Raff v.
Raff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 514, 519, 39 Cal.Rptr.
366, 393 P.2d 678; Code Civ.Proc. § 904.1,
subd. (b)), and if no appeal is taken from such an
order, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to
review it. (Hardin v. Elvitsky (1965) 232
CaI.App.2d 357, 363-364, 42 Cal.Rptr. 748.) 4
Nor can we construe the notice of appeal as
applying to the May 9 order under the rule of

liberal construction. (Cat.Rules of Court, rule
1(b).) The notice, filed on May 26, 1988 states:
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that defendants
ROMAN PRASZKER and
WEST &
PRASZKER REALTORS, INC. appeal from the
judgment filed May 5, 1988, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit 'A.' " (Emphasis added.)
Only a copy of the May 5 judgment was
appended. Thus, despite Praszker's knowledge
of the May 9 order allowing litigation costs and
attorney's fees, the notice of appeal
unambiguously designates only the May 5
judgment.
Praszker's citation to Kellett v. Marvel
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 464, 58 P.2d 649 is not availing.
In that case the notice of appeal was ambiguous-it stated that the party was appealing from an
order denying a motion to resist entry of
judgment, but gave a judgment book entry
description which fit that of a final judgment of
divorce. The court, noting the ambiguity and
rule of [220 Cal.App.3d 47] liberal construction,
treated the appeal as one from the divorce
judgment. Kellett is not apposite because there is
no ambiguity whatever in Praszker's

to point out the jurisdictional defect is of no
consequence. (See Hardin v. Elvitsky, supra,
232 Cal.App.2d at p. 363, 42 Cal.Rptr. 748.)
Because Praszker's notice of appeal totally omits
any reference to the appealable order granting
litigation costs and attorney's fees, this court has
no jurisidiction to review the propriety of that
award.
CROSS-APPEAL ***
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The cause is
remanded to the trial court with directions to
make new findings on the issue of comparative
negligence and enter a new judgment consistent
with views expressed herein. Praszker shall
recover costs on appeal.
KLINE, P.J., and BENSON, J., concur.

* Pursuant 1o rules 976 and 976.1, California
Rules of Court, this opinion is certified for
publication except for part I and the section
entitled "Cross-Appeal."
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** See footnote *, ante.

notice. The rule favoring appealability in cases
of ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear
intention to appeal from only part of the
judgment or one of two separate appealable
judgments or orders. (9 Witkin, op. cit. supra,
Appeal, § 372, p. 374.) "Despite the rule
favoring liberal interpretation of notices of
appeal, a notice of appeal will not be considered
adequate if it completely omits any reference to
the judgment being appealed." (Shiver,
McGrane & Martin v. Littell (1990) 217
Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045,266 Cal.Rptr. 298.)

2 The Code was received into evidence by the
trial court in this case. It is also appropriate for
this court to take judicial notice of it as bearing
on the standard of care for professionals in the
industry. (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (h); Easton v.
Strassburger, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 90, 101, fn.
5, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383.)

Praszker points out that Krug has never
challenged the sufficiency of the notice of
appeal and both parties have treated the issue as
if it were properly before us. But subject matter
jurisdiction can never be created by consent,
waiver or estoppel. (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra,
Jurisdiction, § 10, p. 374.) Thus, Krug's failure
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3 The court's order recites that "the parties
stipulated and the Court ordered that claim [sic]
damages for attorneys fees and costs would be
bifurcated and decided by the Court.
Procedurally the Court stated without objection
that it would reach those elements of damage by
way of cost bill."
4 We reject Praszker's facile argument that the
recitation in the May 5 judgment that plaintiff be
awarded judgment together with "costs and
disbursements" was sufficient to encompass the

subsequently-awarded litigation costs. Under the
court's order and stipulation of the parties, Krug
did not become entitled to such costs until a cost
bill was filed and the motion to tax determined
in a separate proceeding. Moreover, acceptance
of Praszker's position would sabotage the rule
that postjudgment orders allowing or denying
costs and attorneys fees must be separately
appealed from, since virtually all judgments
routinely provide for "costs" to the prevailing
garty.
** * See footnote *, ante.
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Appendix E

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM G BEDDOES vs. GARY GIFFIN
CASE NUMBER 040907525 Miscellaneous

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ANTHONY B. QUINN
PARTIES
Plaintiff - WILLIAM G BEDDOES
Represented by: WILLIAM P MORRISON
Defendant - GARY GIFFIN
Represented by: SEAN A MONSON
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

451.50
451.50
0.00
0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

BAIL/CASH BONDS

300.00
0.00
0.00
300.00

Posted:
Forfeited:
Refunded:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Amount Due:
75.00

Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

75.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
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CASE NUMBER 040907525 Miscellaneous
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

15.00
15.00
0.00
0.00

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00

DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals
Posted By: MORRISON & MORRISON
Posted:
300.00
Forfeited:
0.00
Refunded:
0.00
Balance:
300.00
CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
04-12-04
04-12-04
04-12-04
04-12-04
04-12-04
04-12-04
04-12-04

Case filed
Judge QUINN assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Filed: Demand Civil Jury
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
75.00
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE; Code
Description: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
04-12-04 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL
Payment Received:
75.00
05-07-04 Filed return: Summons
Party Served: GIFFIN, GARY
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 29, 2004
05-18-04 Filed: Answer to Complaint
GARY GIFFIN
07-28-04 Filed order: Stipulated Discovery Plan and Order
Judge aquinn
Signed July 28, 2004
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CASE NUMBER 040907525 Miscellaneous
07-28-04
08-04-04
08-18-04
02-11-05
05-31-05
05-31-05
06-13-05
06-13-05
06-13-05
07-01-05
07-01-05
07-01-05

Tracking started for Other. Review date Sep 01, 2005.
Filed: Plaintiff's Initial Disclosures
Filed: Defendant's Initial Disclosures
Filed: Plaintiff's Designation of Experts
Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
Filed: Notice of Substitution of Counsel
Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed: Affidavit of William G. Beddoes
Filed: Affidavit of Mary Jane Norman
Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment

07-01-05 Filed: Request for Oral Argument Re: Defendantrs Motion for
Summary Judgment
07-14-05 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service
07-14-05 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service
07-19-05 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment
07-19-05 Filed: Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of William
Beddoes and Mary Jane Norman
07-19-05 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of
the Affidavits of William Beddoes and Mary Jane Norman
07-27-05 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Strike
08-03-05 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions
of the Affidavits of William Beddoes and Mary Jane Norman
08-03-05 Filed: Request to Submit Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike for Decision and Request for
Hearing
08-09-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 040907525 ID 6361541
MOT FOR SUMM.J./MOT TO STRIKE is scheduled.
Date: 09/02/2005
Time: 08:45 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W33
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN
08-09-05 MOT FOR SUMM.J./MOT TO STRIKE scheduled on September 02, 2005
at 08:45 AM in Third Floor - W33 with Judge QUINN.
09-02-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for SUMM JUDGMENT /MOT I ON TO STRI
Judge:
ANTHONY B. QUINN
Clerk:
jillenew
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): WILLIAM P MORRISON
Defendant's Attorney(s): SEAN A MONSON
Video
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CASE NUMBER 040907525 Miscellaneous
Tape Number:

video

Tape Count: 8:52

HEARING
COUNT: 8:53
Court states tentataive ruling
COUNT: 8:56
ATD arguments on Summary Judgment
COUNT: 9:03
ATP response
COUNT: 9:10
ATD rebuttal arguments
COUNT:

9:14

Court grants Motion for Summary Judgment
ATD to prepare* the Order
09-07-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
09-07-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
09-22-05 Filed order: Order and Jugdment
Judge aquinn

15.00
15.00

Signed September 22, 2005
09-22-05 Case Disposition is Judgment
Disposition Judge is ANTHONY B. QUINN
09-29-05 Filed: Request for Costs and Memorandum in Support
10-19-05 Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Request for Costs
10-28-05 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Request for Costs
11-01-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's Request for
Costs
11-02-05 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY
Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN
Clerk: katrinah
Defendant's request for costs is denied. The requested costs are
not recoverable costs under Rule 54(b). Photo copies are generally
not recoverable and there is no authority for awarding costs for
transcripts of a Collateral Proceeding.

Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN
11-03-05 Filed: Withdrawal of Notice to Submit for Decision Defendant's
Request for Costs
11-03-05 Filed: Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Request for Costs
11-04-05 Tracking ended for Other.
11-28-05 Filed order: Order Denying Defendant's Request for Costs
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CASE NUMBER 040907525 Miscellaneous

12-20-05
12-20-05
12-22-05
12-22-05
12-22-05
12-22-05
12-22-05
12-22-05
12-29-05
12-29-05
01-09-06
01-13-06
01-17-06
01-18-06

Judge aquinn
Signed November 28, 2005
Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.50
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
Filed: Notice of Appeal
Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
Bond Account created
Total Due:
300.00
Bond Posted
Payment Received:
300.00
Note: Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Utah Supreme
Court
Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter to Counsel - notice of
appeal in this case has been filed with the Utah Supreme Court
- 20051154-SC
Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order - effective twenty days
from the date of this order, this matter will be transferred to
the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition - 20051154-SC
Filed: Notice of Substitution of Counsel
Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - 20051154-ca - Case
assigned to Court of Appeals
Filed: Transcript of Motions for Summary Judgment and to Strike
dated 9-2-05, Milo Harmon, CCT
Note: Record forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals - File-1
unpaginated - 20051154-CA
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Appellate Docket Search
Docket Information Case - 20051154
Utah Court of Appeals
Title: Beddoes v. Giffin
Docket No: 20051154
Agency: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
Status: Dismissal Pending

Docket Date: 12/22/2005
Case: 040907525

Date

Action

Disposition Date

12/22/2005
12/23/2005
12/29/2005
01/03/2006
01/03/2006
01/11/2 006
01/12/2006
01/12/2006
01/17/2006
01/17/2006
01/17/2006
01/18/2006
01/23/2006
01/30/2006
03/30/2006
01/01/3000
D

Notice of Appeal Filed
Courtesy Copy
Pourover to COA-Civil
Transcript Request Received
Ack. of Request for Transcript
Docketing Statement Filed
Retention Ltr Denied/Not Filed
Received from Supreme Ct(Pour)
Motion-Appellee-Summary Dispos
Memorandum of Points & Authori
Call for Record Pursuant to R.
Record Filed - Pursuant to R.l
Response to Motion for Summary
Reply to Response to Motion
Summary Disposition
Remittitur Due - COA
Due

New Search ]

05/30/2006

Appellate Docket Search
Docket Information Case - 20060389
Utah Supreme Court
Title: Beddoes v. Giffin
Docket No: 20060389
Agency: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
Status: Record/Record Index Filed
Date

Action

04/28/2006
04/28/2006
05/31/2006
07/17/2006
07/18/2006
07/18/2006
07/27/2006
07/27/2006
07/27/2006
01/01/3000

Receipt for Payment
Writ of Certiorari Filed
Response to Writ
Writ of Certiorari Granted
Misc. Letter
Called for Record-Certiorari
Record Filed
Transfer of Record from COA
Set Briefing Schedule
Appellant's Brief Due

Docket Date: 04/28/2006
Case: 040907525
Disposition Date
Granted

07/17/2006

Due

09/08/2006

a
New Search

Appendix F

Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule 50, the Supreme Court
will enter an order denying the petition or granting the petition in whole or in part The order shall be decided summarily,
shall be without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision on the merits The clerk shall not issue a formal writ
unless directed by the Supreme Court
(b) Grant of petition
(1) Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall
notify the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record
(2) If the record has not previously been filed, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the clerk of the court with
custody of the record to certify it and transmit it to the Supreme Court
(3) The clerk shall file the record and give notice to the parties of the date on which it was filed and the date on which
petitioner's brief is due
(4) Rules 24 through 31 shall govern briefs, argument, and disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari In applying Rules
24 through 31, the petitioner shall stand in the place of the appellant and the respondent in the place of the appellee
(c) Denial of petition Whenever a petition for a writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that effect will be entered, and the
Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of record

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the
court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter
by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim,
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of afinaljudgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of
several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of
the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in
amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this
state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs
of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall
abide thefinaldetermination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment
serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of
his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have
been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs
taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service andfilingof the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall

nevertheless be considered as served andfiledon the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by
him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same
have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.

